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Condemnations of war are easy to find. Social critics, politicians, and even generals speak out against it. The philosopher
John Stuart Mill noted that it is an "ugly thing."' Georges Clemenceau, who was Prime Minister of France during World War
I, believed that war is "too serious a matter to leave to soldiers."2
War is a "racket," according to Marine Corps Major General
Smedley D. Butler, who was twice awarded the Congressional
Medal of Honor.3 But war is also fascinating and alluring.
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1 John Stuart Mill, The Contest in America 31 (Little, Brown 1862).
2
J. Hampden Jackson, Clemenceau and the Third Republic 228 (Macmillan 1948).
"La guerre! C'est une chose trop grave pour la confier A des militaires . . . ." George Suarez, 1 Soixante Annees d'HistoireFrangaise:Clemenceau 176 (Tallandier 1932). A generation later General Charles de Gaulle, who became president of France, turned the quotation around: "I have come to the conclusion that politics are too serious a matter to be
left to the politicians." Francis Williams, Tiilight of Empire: Memoirs of Prime Minister
Clement Attlee 56 (Barnes 1962).
3
Smedley D. Butler, Wiar Is a Racket 1, 8 (Round Table 1935) ("War is a racket. It
always has been.").
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During one battle General Robert E. Lee, remarked: "It is well
that war is so terrible, or we would grow too fond of it."4
War is also an integral part of human society and inherently
tied to politics. One might teach most of Western history as the
preparation for war, the actual war, the recovery from the war,
and the preparation for the next war.5 In addition to the Civil
War, the United States has been involved in at least thirteen
major foreign wars covering about one-fifth of the nation's history. 6 This does not include innumerable campaigns, battles, and
wars with American Indian nations.7 To these large-scale military conflicts we must add bellicose moments and events that
involved ground and naval conflict and some casualties, but
stopped just short of a full-scale war;8 the use of the national
armed forces to suppress domestic insurrections;9 and numerous
4
E.P. Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative 302
(Scribner's Sons 1907).
5
Obviously few historians approach the past this way, and many "social historians" ignore war, law, politics, and economics altogether. My point here is not that history
should be approached as one war after another, but rather that the chronology of Western history would support this.
6
Barbary Pirates War (1801-1805); War of 1812 (1812-1815); Mexican War
(1846-1847); Spanish-American War (1898-1900); Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902);
World War 1 (1917-1918); World War 11 (1941-1945); Korean War (1949-1953); Vietnam
War (1959-1974); Panama Invasion (1989-1990); Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm)
(1990-1991); Afghanistan War (2001-present), and Iraq War (2003-2012). See Micheal
Clodfelter, 14arfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other
Figures, 1500-2000 221, 271-96, 435-600, 655, 722-50 (McFarland 2002). See also Eytan Gilboa, The PanamaInvasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold
War Era, 110 Polit Sci Q 539, 539-41 (1995) (outlining the circumstances surrounding
the conflict between the United States and Panama). See also Jordan J. Paust, Use of
Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 Cornell Intl L J
533, 534-45 (2002) (explaining the circumstances surrounding the military actions in
Iraq and Afghanistan).
7
Most of these conflicts were short-term, rarely lasting more than a year or two,
although the Second Seminole War lasted from 1835 to 1842. See Clodfelter, Warfare
and Armed Conflicts at 296 (cited in note 6).
8
Such events include the Quasi War with France in 1789-1799, see id at 15 (describing the dates and circumstances surrounding the Quasi War with France), and the
armed attack by the British ship The Leopard on The Chesapeake in 1807, which led to
the death of a handful of American sailors and ultimately to reparations from the British, but not full-scale war. See J.C.A. Stagg, et al, eds, 4 The Papers of James Madison:
PresidentialSeries 12 (Virginia 1999) (notifying Congress that the "subject of difference,
between the two Countries, is terminated by an offer of reparation which has been acceded to").
9 For example, the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania (1793), Bleeding Kansas
(1854-1857), the Mormon War (1857-1858), the use of army officers and US Marines to
suppress John Brown's raid on the US Armory at Harpers Ferry, Virginia (1859), the
suppression of the Pullman strike in 1893, the assault on World War I veterans in response to the Bonus March (1932), and the use of the US Army and federalized state
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military adventures of varying lengths in China, Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Soviet Union, Lebanon, Grenada, Kosovo, Libya, and elsewhere.10 With this history
in mind, one could argue that years of peace-when no American troops were killed or killed anyone else in combat-are far
less common than years in which there was lethal combat involving Americans. The United States has not declared war
since World War II ended in 1945,11 but since then more than
100 thousand US servicemen and servicewomen have died in
combat and nearly 300 thousand have been wounded.12
The history of European nations is even bloodier, and if the
use of European troops outside the continent in worldwide conflicts,13 colonial wars, insurrections, and rebellions is included,
this history is more gruesome still. In just ten years (1914-1919,
1939-1945) of the first half of the twentieth century Europe itself was the scene of the slaughter of about sixty million people.14 Twenty-first-century Europeans praise themselves for not

militia during urban riots in Detroit (1967), Washington, DC (1968), and other cities. See
Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts at 15, 280, 285 (cited in note 6). See also
Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know about Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 Cornell J L
& Pub Pol 101, 114-18 (2006); Roy L. Brooks, Making the Case for Atonement in "Postracial America", 14 J Gender Race & Just 665, 675-77 (2011); Charles R. Murray, Civil
Disturbance,JustifiableHomicide, and Military Law, 54 Milit L Rev 129, 129-30 (1971).
See also generally Edwin Brown Firmage and Richard Collin Mangrum, Zion in the
Courts:A Legal History of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 1830-1900
(Illinois 1988).
10 For a handy list of many (but not all) US military actions, see Clodfelter, Warfare
and Armed Conflicts at 261, 278-80, 604-06, 617, 654, 706-10, 713-14 (cited in note 6).
11 The Authorization for Use of Military Force in 2001 might constitute a postmodern version of a declaration of war. See Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking Whr Powers:
Congress, the President, and the United Nations, 81 Georgetown L J 597, 625-30, 640-47
(1993). See also Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub L No 107-40, 115
Stat 224 (2001), codified at 50 USC § 1541.
12 Anne Leland and Mari-Jana "M-J" Oboroceanu, American Whr and Military Operations Casualties:Lists and Statistics (Congressional Research Service Feb 26, 2010),
online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ers/natsec/RL32492.pdf (visited Nov 24, 2013).
13 These would include the Crusades, the worldwide conflict from 1756 to 1763
known as the French and Indian War in the United States, the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and combat in Africa and
Asia in World War II. See Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts at 13-15, 131-34,
272, 285, 414, 435, 581 (cited in note 6).
14 This figure is for military and civilian deaths in World War I and World War II
and the nine million killed during the Russian Revolutions/civil wars of 1917-1919. This
does not include the millions of people in the Soviet Union-perhaps twenty millionwho died under Stalin, as they were not victims of war. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels
of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined 195 (Viking 2011) (providing a useful table of
deaths in warfare, but inexplicably including a number of examples of mass deaths that
were not caused by war, and including some "events" that lasted many centuries).
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having had a major war for more than a half century. 15 Europe
had never achieved this level of peace in the previous millennium. 16 But such self-congratulatory hubris ignores conflicts in
Cyprus, Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Hungary, and
Chechnya as well as the use of European troops in Korea, Indochina, Malaysia, Egypt, Algeria, all over sub-Saharan Africa,
Kuwait, the Falklands (or Malvinas), Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali,
and other places.
Military conflict is a manifestation of politics and public policy. The great military theorist Carl Philipp Gottfried von
Clausewitz succinctly made the point: "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."17 Mao Tse-Tung, who understood the power of force as well as anyone, believed that "politics
is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."18
Whether seen as policy, politics, or both, as General William
Tecumseh Sherman reminded the world, "War is hell."19 Most
modern nations, while maintaining armies and engaging in
armed conflict for defense or as a "continuation of policy," have
simultaneously tried to reduce the destruction and human
costs of warfare borne by both soldiers and civilians.20 Leaders,
15
See Andrew Higgins, European Officials Accept Union's Nobel Peace Prize, NY
Times A14 (Dec 11, 2012) (describing the ceremony and context in which European Union officials received the Nobel Peace Prize for the continued peace in Europe).
16 Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature at 231 (cited in note 14) (asserting that
there were over 2,300 separate wars in Europe from the year 900 to the present, or about
"two new conflicts a year for eleven hundred years").
17 Carl von Clausewitz, On War 87 (Princeton 1976) (Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, eds and trans):

It is clear, consequently, that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political
instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means. What remains
peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and
the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend
and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of
course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a
given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the
goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.
18 Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War 58 (Pacific 2001).
19 See Lloyd Lewis, Sherman: Fighting Prophet 636 (Brace 1932).
20 Obviously some nations-Germany from 1939 to 1945 is the most obvious example-have used war as a vehicle for mass murder purely for its own sake. It is for this
reason Germany's leaders were tried and punished for war crimes. See Gwynne Skinner,
Nurenberg's Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials' Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts under the Alien Tort Statute, 71 Albany L Rev 321, 339-41 (2008).
Similar behavior in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s also led to war crimes trials. See
id. The Iran-Iraq War from 1980-1988 is an example of a war in which the leaders on
both sides showed little concern for limiting their own casualties or collateral damage
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diplomats, generals, and scholars have also tried to develop
"rules" for warfare to eliminate unnecessary violence, destruction, and suffering, and to protect, as much as possible, the lives
and property of noncombatants.21 The law of war has also incorporated rules to protect the lives of captured soldiers and regulate their treatment, 22 ban the use of some kinds of weapons
(such as poisons, small explosive projectiles, mustard gas, or
serrated bayonets),23 and prohibit certain kinds of behavior (such
as shooting at someone under a flag of truce when forces are not
engaged in combat, torture, and targeted assassinations).24
The law of war was developed to rein in the horror of warto make it less "hell[ish]," in Sherman's terms. 25 But ironically
these humanitarian restraints have condoned massive destruction of property and the killing of large numbers of human beings. As George C. Scott succinctly put it in his brilliant cinematic portrayal of General George S. Patton, "No bastard ever
won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the
other poor dumb bastard die for his country."26 War in the end is
about making the other "poor bastards" die for their country.
The law of war is about regulating the carnage, controlling and
reducing the horror, and limiting the destruction. But the law of
war neither prevents nor condemns war per se, and thus condones, or at least allows, much of the killing or the devastation
that goes with it.
In the rest of this Review I explore the history of the law of
war in the context of Professor John Fabian Witt's recent book,
Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History. The heart
of this book focuses on the American Civil War, and especially
on the first serious attempt to provide a practical code for the
leading to the deaths of civilians. See Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-IraqMilitary Conflict 137 (Grafton 1989).
21 See Paul Kennedy and George J. Andreopoulos, The Laws of Wiar: Some Concluding Reflections, in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, The
Laws of W4ar: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World 214, 214 (Yale 1994).
22 See Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field Art 56 (War Dept 1863) (cited as "Lieber Code").
23 See Lieber Code Art 70 (cited in note 22). In the twelfth century there were attempts to ban bows, and particularly crossbows, but this failed. See Robert C. Stacey,
The Age of Chiivalry, in Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, The Laws of War 27, 30
(cited in note 21). In the thirteenth century the papacy "hired hundreds of crossbowmen
for its wars against the emperor Frederick II." Id.
24 See Lieber Code Art 56 (cited in note 22). See also Lieber Code Art 148 (cited in
note 22).
25 See Lewis, Sherman at 637 (cited in note 19).
26 Patton (20th Century Fox 1970).
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law of war-Francis Lieber's short tract, Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,27 better
known as the Lieber Code. Lieber wrote the Lieber Code (he was
technically part of the committee but everyone agrees it was his
work28) at the request of Major General Henry W. Halleck, the
general-in-chief of the United States Army. The document was
"approved by the President of the United States,"29 and then issued by the War Department as General Order No. 100.30 The
War Department distributed copies to all officers. While written
as a Civil War regulation, the Lieber Code remained in force into the twentieth century and became the basis of future international agreements on the law of war. Thus, while the Lieber
Code is at the heart of Professor Witt's project, his book offers
much more, including a serious and significant history of the law
of war in the preceding centuries.
Let me start out by noting that this is an elegantly written,
engaging book with an enormous amount of terrific information
and analysis. I have some major disagreements with Witt on
some issues, and as I set out in Part VI of this Review, I believe
he misunderstands Lincoln on emancipation and fails to consider the importance of the Constitution in shaping both emancipation and the Lieber Code. Similarly, as I set out in Part VIII, I
think Witt incorrectly blames the Lieber Code for the horrendous behavior of the United States Army in the years after the
Civil War. But, despite these reservations, I think this is a must
read for anyone interested in the law of war, the history of warfare, or modern issues of warfare and terrorism. It ought to be
required reading in courses dealing with public international
law and issues of war and peace.
My goal in the rest of this Review is to explain the significance and the content of the Lieber Code, to place it in the context of both the American Civil War and the development of the
modern law of war, and to offer an analysis and critique of Professor Witt's work. Slavery is central to Witt's book and to my
argument here. Witt argues that slavery was a driving force in
27 The most convenient edition of this document is in the Foundations of Law Series published by the Lawbook Exchange. Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Governent of Armies of the United States in the Field; Guerilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War (Lawbook Exchange 2011) (Steve Sheppard, ed).
28 Jordan J. Paust, Dr. Francis Lieber and the Lieber Code, 95 Am Socy Intl L Proc
112, 114 (2001).
29 Lieber Code at 2 (cited in note 22).
30 Id.
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American foreign and military policy from the Revolution to the
Civil War (p 77). He further argues that it was a central part of
the Lieber Code (p 227). Witt is right on both counts, although
he surprisingly never comes to terms with why slavery was central to American policy. Nor does he ever grapple with the constitutional issues that limited Lincoln's options on emancipation.
In the end, slavery helped shape the Lieber Code, but in ways
that are more complicated than Witt describes.
While Witt argued that slavery was the motivation for the
Lieber Code, as I note later in this Review, this overstates the
case. Those who commissioned the code-most notably General
Henry W. Halleck-were concerned with many issues of how to
regulate an American army marching across the southern United States. The Lincoln War Department was deeply concerned
about the treatment of prisoners of war, the disposition of civilian (nonslave) property, and maintaining discipline in the army.
Finally, beyond slavery the administration was deeply concerned about the treatment of captured black soldiers and the
behavior of its army-and the Confederate army-towards civilians.
I begin with Lieber himself,31 who is really at the heart of
this book. While Witt makes a claim for his title, based on Lincoln's own wartime goals, it strikes me that this book's title is
mostly about marketing and grabbing the attention of readers.
Books with "Lincoln" in the title sell better than books named
for some long-forgotten legal theorist. But, for scholarship on
this issue, the central figure is Francis Lieber, not Abraham
Lincoln. As Witt admits, "Abraham Lincoln took no role in commissioning the code, at least not one that we know of' (p 237).
I turn in Part II to a brief history of the law of war before
the modern era. The history of the law of war before the late
eighteenth century involves the evolution from unrestrained
combat, bloodshed, destruction, and confiscation of property to a
system of articulated customary rules and published treatises,
designed to limit the brutality and destruction caused by warfare. In the ancient world there were generally few constraints
on armies or soldiers. Prisoners of war and captured civilians
might be executed, tortured, or enslaved, and cities might be
plundered and razed. The property of the defeated, as well as
many captured soldiers and citizens, was seized as booty by individual soldiers and carried by victorious armies to imperial

31

See Part I.
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cities like Rome as trophies of conquest. The brutality of ancient
war was modified, to some extent, by medieval concepts of a just
war, but, even these developments were unsatisfactory, in part
because religious justifications for war could be used to legitimize the slaughter of nonbelievers, Jews, Moslems, and others.
In Part III, I turn to the evolution of war theory during and
after the Renaissance. Here we see early modern legal theorists
such as Hugo Grotius and Emmerich Vattel arguing for humane,
gentle, and limited warfare, in response to the brutal and unrestrained warfare of earlier times. Paradoxically, scholars of war
and political and legal theorists argued that hard combat was
more humane because it led to shorter wars. The most important proponent of this position was Carl Philipp Gottfried
von Clausewitz.32 In Parts IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII, I consider the
application of the Lieber Code during the Civil War and its impact on slavery, the treatment of prisoners, the disposition of civilian property, and the behavior of both United States and Confederate troops during the Civil War. In Part IX, I offer a brief
discussion of the application of the Lieber Code after the Civil
War to wars against Native Americans. This leads to some final
considerations of the application of the Lieber Code, or any set of
rules and regulations, to actual warfare.
I. FRANCIS LIEBER: FROM TEENAGE SOLDIER TO LAW OF WAR
THEORIST

The modern history of the law of war begins during the
American Civil War, with the work of Francis Lieber, a historian, political scientist, and constitutional theorist who was teaching at Columbia College (which later became Columbia University). Mostly forgotten today, Lieber, a German immigrant and
naturalized US citizen, was better known in his own time, but
only among an elite class of intellectuals and lawyers.
As a child, Lieber watched in horror as Napoleon's troops
marched into Berlin in 1806.38 As a teenager he joined the Colberg militia34 and was left for dead on the field in the Waterloo

See Clausewitz, On War at 77 (cited in note 17).
See Peter W. Becker, Prologue: Lieber's Place in History, in Charles R. Mack and
Henry H. Lesesne, eds, FrancisLieber and the Culture of the Mind 1, 1 (South Carolina
2005).
34 Frank Freidel, Francis Lieber: Nineteenth Century Liberal 11 (Louisiana State
1947).
32

33
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Campaign35 He survived and returned to Germany, where he
earned a PhD in mathematics and joined various underground
groups that opposed the authoritarianism of his native Prussia.36
He was arrested twice, and in 1826 he prudently left his homeland.37 Although he was considered a radical in Prussia, by the
standards of the United States he was politically and socially
moderate or even conservative. For the rest of his life he would
be a vocal advocate of the rule of law, an uncompromising nationalist, and a passionate defender of the Union. He had
firsthand experience with the horror of war, but he fully understood its necessity in the real world and the need to rein in the
violence of armed conflict. He became an advocate of meaningful
rules that would constitute a law of war, but emphatically rejected the idea of pacifism (pp 177-79).
Lieber arrived in the United States with a handful of letters
of introduction from some of the leading German intellectuals of
the age.38 By this time his intellectual interests had shifted from
mathematics to politics, history, and law. In his first years in
America, Lieber had some modest successes, but also a major
disappointment. He hoped to find a position at a university, but
this did not happen in the years after his arrival. He briefly
taught gymnastics and swimming39 but his Germanic belief in
the virtues of exercise and sports gained little traction in the
young republic. He hobnobbed with emerging intellectuals and
became something of an expert on pedagogy. He served as a research assistant for Alexis de Tocqueville, who had come to
America to study its prisons, and he published various pamphlets and essays on politics, philosophy, constitutional law, and
criminal justice. 40 His circle of friends and mentors included

35

See Becker, Lieber's Place in History at 1 (cited in note 33).

36 See Francis R. Harley, FrancisLieber: His Life and Political Philosophy 21 (Co-

lumbia 1899).
37 See Freidel, FrancisLieber at 46 (cited in note 34).
38 His German patrons included the historian Leopold von Ranke and the scientist
Alexander von Humboldt. See Becker, Lieber's Place in History at 1 (cited in note 33)
(stating that he arrived in Boston with the letters of introduction from his "German
friends").
39 Id.
40 See Paul Finkelman, Lieber, Slavery, and the Problem of Free Thought in Antebellun South Carolina,in Mack and Lesesne, Culture of the Mind 11, 15 (cited in note
33) (stating that Lieber helped Tocqueville and Beaumont on their "study of American
prisons"). See also generally G. de Beaumont and A. de Toqueville, On the Penitentiary
System in the United States, and its Application in France (Carey 1833) (Francis Lieber,
trans) (assessing the penal system in the United States).
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Justice Joseph Story, Chancellor James Kent, Senator Daniel
Webster, the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, and the young
reformer and future US Senator Charles Sumner (p 176). He
served as an advisor to the founders of New York University and
created the Encyclopedia Americana41 by translating an existing
German encyclopedia into English and then adding and deleting
hundreds of entries to Americanize the project. This work
brought Lieber significant fame, which he hoped would lead to a
professorship at Harvard, the newly created NYU, or any other
college in the northeast.42 But such plum positions did not materialize for the heavily accented, rather didactic immigrant whose
lack of refined social graces reflected his humble origins.
In 1835, Lieber became a professor of history and political
economy at South Carolina College, which would eventually be
transformed into the University of South Carolina.43 There he
published extensively on political science, criminology, economics, and philosophy. His scholarship on prison reform and penology, which began when he worked for de Tocqueville, enhanced
his growing reputation and led his newly adopted state to name
its penitentiary for him.44
While providing him with a steady income, the move to
South Carolina was hardly fulfilling.45 Lieber was separated
from the intellectual centers of the nation in New York, Boston,
and Philadelphia and from his friends in those places. He instinctively opposed slavery,46 but was living in the heart of
America's slaveocracy, where he never felt at home.47 While in
South Carolina, Lieber avoided writing on slavery, knowing that
anything he wrote would either cause him to lose his job (if he
were critical of slavery) or cost him most of his friends and contacts among Northern intellectuals (if he supported the institution).48

41 While the project was enormously successful, Lieber did not profit from its success because he produced the Encyclopedia Americana as a work for hire. Becker,
Lieber's Place in History at 2 (cited in note 33).
42 Id at 3.
43 See id.
44 It is known today as the Lieber Correctional Institution. See Gerhard Weiss, The
Americanizationof Franz Lieber and the Encyclopedia Americana, in Lynne Tatlock and
Matt Erlin, eds, German Culture in Nineteenth-Century America: Reception, Adaption,
Transformation 273, 273 (Camden 2005).
45 See Finkelman, Lieber, Slavery, and the Problem of Free Thought at 11-12 (cited
in note 40).
46 See id at 12.
47 See id.
48 See id at 12-13.
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He initially tried to manage his household with free labor, bringing young relatives from Germany as servants. But South Carolina society could neither comprehend nor countenance young
white women working as servants, even when they were the foreign cousins of an eccentric German-born professor. Eventually
Lieber purchased a few slaves as house servants, 49 simply because he could not maintain a proper middle-class lifestyle without household help.0 For more than two decades he lived in
South Carolina but always felt he was in exile.
The intellectual straightjacket of slavery ultimately doomed
him in South Carolina. His only commercially successful book
was On Civil Liberty and Self-Government,1 which was "widely
used as a text book in high schools and colleges."52 This twovolume explication of American government never mentions
slavery, despite its place at the center of all of the important political debates of the age. 5 3 Lieber undoubtedly hoped that by
avoiding a discussion of slavery he could retain his position in
South Carolina and maintain his national prestige as an important intellectual. But this was not possible. Northerners
might appreciate that he could not discuss slavery while teaching in South Carolina, but leaders of the Palmetto State were
not so understanding. By the 1850s it was not enough to abstain
from criticizing slavery. A professor at the state's most important academic institution was expected to openly support
slavery. Indeed, the very fact that he refused to discuss slavery
in a major work about American politics and government made
him suspect in South Carolina. The leaders of the state correctly
suspected that Lieber secretly hated slavery.54
In 1851, Lieber served as the interim president of the college (his title was "President Pro Tem"), and he fully expected to

49 See Hartmut Keil, Francis Lieber's Attitudes on Race, Slavery, and Abolition, 28
J Am Ethnic Hist 13, 13 (Fall 2008).
50
For a discussion of Lieber's South Carolina career and its relationship to slavery, see Finkelman, Lieber, Slavery, and the Problem of Free Thought at 11-22 (cited in
note 40).
51 Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-Governrnent (Bentley 1853).
52 See Becker, Lieber's Place in History at 5 (cited in note 33).
53 Id. For a discussion of the centrality of slavery in the political debates of the
time, see Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with Death, 38
Pepperdine L Rev 845, 856-58 (2011). See generally Paul Finkelman The Appeasement of
1850, in Paul Finkelman and Donald R. Kennon, eds, Congress and the Crisis of the
1850s 36 (Ohio University 2012).
54 See Finkelman, Lieber, Slavery, and the Problem of Free Thought at 18 (cited in
note 40).
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be rewarded for his years of service and his scholarly achievements with the permanent presidency. But the trustees rejected
Lieber in favor of Reverend James Henley Thornwell,66 a fanatically proslavery professor of theology, who had just published a
pamphlet on the "Rights and Duties of Masters."56 Thornwell,
whose sermons and essays provided biblical support for slavery,
was clearly the safer choice for the college. When the presidency
became vacant again in 1855, Lieber assumed it was his turn to
run the college.65 After two decades of service to the institution,
Lieber believed he deserved the presidency. He was the college's
most productive scholar, with both a national and an international reputation. His recently published On Civil Liberty and
Self-Government had brought great prestige to the college. But
the leaders of South Carolina did not trust him. It was not that
he openly opposed slavery-because he did not-but that he was
not openly proslavery. From the perspective of the leaders of
South Carolina, Lieber clearly was "soft" on slavery.58 His annual trips to New York and New England and his seemingly endless correspondence with well-known opponents of slavery led to
the logical and correct conclusion that while not an active abolitionist, Lieber was surely a fellow traveler of those who opposed
and hated slavery (pp 175-77).
When the presidency went to Charles F. McClay, a mathematics professor, the disappointed Lieber resigned his professorship.59 In January 1857 he moved to New York, where he became a professor of history and political science at Columbia
College.o No longer an untested immigrant mathematician,
Lieber was now an accomplished scholar with a national and an
international reputation, and an elite Northern school was happy to hire him.
Thus, when the Civil War began, the United States-and
not the putative Confederate nation-had the advantage of
Lieber's considerable knowledge of political theory and the legal

See id.
See also J.H. Thornwell, The Rights and Duties of Masters: A Sermon Preached
at the Dedication of a Church Erected in Charleston, S.C. for the Benefit and Instruction
of the Coloured Population 31 (Walker 1850).
57 See Finkelman, Lieber, Slavery, and the Problem of Free Thought at 18 (cited in
note 40).
58 Id.
59 Id at 19 (stating that Lieber offered to resign from the college after "losing his bid
for the presidency").
60 See id at 20.
55

56
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implications of war. Freed from the straightjacket of South Carolina's proslavery orthodoxy and anti-intellectualism, Lieber
was now openly antislavery, strongly nationalistic, and deeply
opposed to secession. He enthusiastically worked for Lincoln's
election and was deeply devoted to the Union cause. 61 Had he
been younger, the veteran of the Napoleonic wars would have
made an ideal general to command the many German-speaking
soldiers entering the United States Army. But at age sixty-three
Lieber was destined for a more important role: providing the
administration with a legal code for conducting the war. 6 2
Even before Lieber created what we today call the Lieber
Code, he helped the administration by providing a theoretical
analysis and a practical framework for dealing with Confederate
prisoners63 and for dealing with irregular Confederate combatants-marauders and guerilla fighters.64 In June 1862-about a
month before Lincoln began to draft the Emancipation Proclamation-Lieber provided Attorney General Edward Bates with a
memorandum (which was published in newspapers) explaining
why it was permissible, under the laws of war, to free slaves
who entered US Army lines.65 Lieber asserted a slave became
free when he "present[ed] himself to our troops as coming from
the enemy and claiming our protection" (p 228).
Lieber's next contribution to the legal theory of warfare
came on the heels of the first significant battle of the war. After
what today is called the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21,
1861, the administration was uncertain what to do with captured Confederate prisoners. If secession was illegal, as Lincoln
contended, then the captured Confederates were not soldiers but
brigands, or perhaps some form of land-based pirates, making
war on the general populace. As such they might be imprisoned,
sentenced to hard labor, or even summarily executed. While this
comported with Lincoln's theory of secession-as an illegal insurrection or rebellion-the application of this theory to

61 See Finkelman, Lieber, Slavery, and the Problem of Free Thought at 20 (cited in
note 40).
62 Id.
63 See Francis Lieber, The Disposal of Prisoners,NY Times 5 (Aug 19, 1861).
64 See generally Francis Lieber, GuerrillaParties Considered with Reference to the
Laws and Usages of Iar (Van Nostrand 1862). This pamphlet is conveniently reprinted
along with the Lieber Code itself in Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of
the United States in the Field (cited in note 27).
65 See Francis Lieber, Duty of Provisional Governors:Letter frot ProfessorLieber to
Secretary Bates, The Evening Post, New York City 1 (June 17, 1862).
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captured Confederates was fraught with danger. Sending Confederate prisoners of war to hard labor, or summarily executing
them, would only lead to retaliation by the Confederacy against
captured Union soldiers and encourage barbaric behavior on
both sides. Everyone in the administration knew this. But Attorney General Edward Bates worried that treating captured
Confederate soldiers as prisoners of war would be a de facto
recognition of the Confederacy as a legitimate nation. Lincoln,
who was also not an expert on international law or the law of
war, feared this as well (p 163).
On August 19, 1861, Lieber helped extricate the administration from its dilemma with an open letter in the New York Times
on the nature of Confederate prisoners. He noted this question
involved "[c]onsiderations of law, authority, humanity, [and]
wise foresight."66 As Lieber explained, the issue concerned not
only the treatment of captured Confederates-whether they
were soldiers or pirates-but also how the Confederacy might
treat captured Union soldiers. Lieber argued that traditional
rules of war should be applied to prisoners and that doing so did
not constitute a formal or diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy but was merely "the recognition of reality."67 Lieber offered
an analogy that set the issue out clearly: "When a highway robber asks my purse, and I, being unarmed, consider it expedient
to give it, I certainly recognize the robber, but it is no more than
a recognition of a fact."68 This analogy must surely have pleased
the administration because it compared the Confederates to
criminals, while at the same time providing a practical response
to the prisoner issue.
For humanitarian reasons, Lieber also acknowledged the
importance of treating Confederate prisoners as soldiers fighting
for a legitimate belligerent69 under international law. Lieber assured the administration that treating captured Confederates as
prisoners of war would not constitute de facto recognition of the
Confederacy as an independent nation.70 Rather, it would merely
be a humanitarian act for the sake of those captured on both
sides. He even argued that treating captured Confederates as

66 See Lieber, The Disposal of Prisoners, NY Times at 5 (cited in note 63).
67

Id.

68 Id.
69 See Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 175-76 (Cambridge
1947).
70 See Lieber, The Disposal of Prisoners, NY Times at 5 (cited in note 63).
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prisoners of war would not prevent subsequent treason prosecutions, if that was what the government wanted to do. But it
would be a practical solution to the immediate problem, since
both sides had captured each other's soldiers.
This letter in the New York Times was Lieber's first formal
step towards developing a humane set of rules for warfare, in
the context of the horror and brutality of the expanding war.
Eventually Lieber's theory would lead to prisoner exchanges and
paroles of captured soldiers.71 In this letter Lieber observed that
it would be possible, and even legal under existing rules of war,
to execute captured Confederates. He noted that such a policy
would have been legal because the administration could treat
Confederate prisoners as the equivalent of pirates, but he rejected any thought of this on the ground that it would reduce the
United States to the level of the Jacobins during the French
Revolution who "guillotined . . . the prisoners they made."72
Lieber's point was clear: civilized, humane nations did not execute prisoners of war and the United States had to follow such
rules. This was the beginning of the development of what would
eventually be the Lieber Code.

71
When prisoners were exchanged, they resumed their place in the army and
could be sent back into combat. When paroled they were sent back to their own lines
with the stipulation that they could not return to combat but might serve in the army in
a noncombat role, including garrisoning forts away from the front lines. Lieber Code Art
130 (cited in note 22). If a paroled soldier did return to combat, and was subsequently
captured, the recaptured soldier could legitimately be executed. Thus Lieber admonished
that "[a]ccurate lists, therefore, of the paroled persons must be kept by the belligerents."
Lieber Code Art 124 (cited in note 22). The concept of paroling captured soldiers was an
important example of moving towards a humane law of war. Under the parole system an
enemy might release prisoners of war, sending them home or back to their own lines, for
noncombat duty. This was surely preferable, and more humane, than sending them to
POW camps. However, the parole system also allowed belligerents to relieve themselves
of the duty of caring for, feeding, housing, and guarding enemy prisoners, which all understandings of the law of war required, and which was set out in the Lieber Code. Confederate military leaders frequently paroled captured US soldiers because they had no
place to put them. While prisoner exchanges and paroles were more humane for the individual soldiers, the Lieber Code did not require them and allowed belligerents to refuse
to accept parolees, or refuse to engage in prisoner exchanges. Toward the end of the war,
General Grant opposed all prisoner exchanges in part because Confederates refused to
exchange black prisoners of war on racist grounds. Grant refused to allow a differentiation among his soldiers on the basis of race. At the same time, he could afford to do this
because he could conduct his military operations without redeeming prisoners and using
them in combat again, while the Confederates were desperate for men. This aspect of the
Lieber Code illustrates that humane treatment, while possible, was not required in
many cases. For those soldiers captured and left in prisoner-of-war camps, the war was
its own special hell.
72 See Lieber, The Disposal of Prisoners, NY Times at 5 (cited in note 63).
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In a subsequent essay, commissioned by Major General
Henry W. Halleck, the general-in-chief of the army, that was
published as a pamphlet in August 1862, Lieber set out rules for
dealing with guerrilla soldiers and other irregular forces.73 Here
he argued that "guerrilla-men, when captured in fair fight and
open warfare, should be treated as the regular partisan is, until
special crimes, such as murder, or the killing of prisoners, or the
sacking of places, are proved upon them."74 Lieber argued that
this was the precedent of "the most humane belligerents in recent times."76 In December, Halleck commissioned Lieber to
write what became the Lieber Code.
In these early works and later in the Lieber Code, Lieber
"formulate[d] seminal doctrines on the problems of irregular
warfare and the occupation of hostile territories."76 Lieber's
work, and the work of those who followed him,77 fundamentally
altered the way the United States-and then most of the rest of
the world-viewed the relationship between law and war.
Lieber's life and career prepared him to write the Lieber Code.
In the rest of this Review I will explore the nature of the Lieber
Code in greater detail as well as its influence on the conduct of
the Civil War.
II. JUST WAR AND THE NEED FOR THE LIEBER CODE
The Lieber Code is at the center of Professor Witt's fine book
(p 237). Professor Witt sets out the history of how the United
States, and by extension the world community, have used lawsomething called the law of war-to limit the horror and destruction of armed conflict. At the same time the law of war was
also a tool of statecraft that was useful to help win a war and
negotiate a peace. It is a mixed history. The very idea of a law
for warfare might seem like an oxymoron. Law is orderly, providing a process for a civil and peaceful resolution of differences. War

73 See generally Lieber, Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laus
and Usages of 14ar (cited in note 64).
74 Id at 20.
75 Id.
76 James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of
Modern War 237 (Harvard 2012).
77 Whitman argues that these rules were also formulated by Johann Caspar
Bluntschli of Switzerland. However, Bluntschli wrote a decade after Lieber. Id at 237,
310 n 80, citing Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Dos Moderne Vdlkerrecht der Civilisirten
Staten (1872).
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is violent and without any calmness or even order. The fog of
battle leads to death and mayhem at every turn.
Nevertheless, the modern world has accepted general rules
for how armies and nations should behave during wartime.
These rules are surely different than they were in the ancient
world. Generally, the law of war in the ancient world was one of
unrestrained violence and brutality. One minor exception to this
was classical Greece, where there were "unwritten conventions
governing interstate conflict."78 Thus, the ancient Greek states
held that "[p]risoners of war should be offered for ransom rather
than being summarily executed or mutilated"79 and "noncombatants should not be primary targets of attack."80 However, these
and similar rules applied only to "intra-Greek warfare" for the
period of 700 to 450 BCE81 and did not apply to warfare with
non-Greeks.
For the Romans, "[t]he best reason for going to war was defence of the frontiers, and, almost as good, pacification of barbarians living beyond the frontiers."82 Such reasons allowed for the
Roman conquest of much of the known world. Once the wars began, there were virtually no limitations on the behavior of the
army. "Prisoners could be enslaved or massacred; plunder was
general; and no distinction was recognized between combatants
and noncombatants."83 Roman warfare was "merciless savagery."84
In the rest of the ancient world it was pretty much the
same. Defeated enemies-both civilians and soldiers-were
slaughtered and enslaved; women were taken to serve those who
captured them; cities were razed and booty was carried off by
victorious soldiers. Cities might avoid destruction by paying
tribute to their conquerors. Individuals might escape bondage
through ransom, but only if their captors did not choose to kill or
enslave them. The enslavement, mutilation, torture, and slaughter of those who resisted an invading army served as a powerful
message to the next target, and could lead to surrender, negotiations, and the payment of tribute.
78
Josiah Ober, Classical Greek Times, in Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman,
Laus of War 12, 13 (cited in note 21).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Stacey, The Age of Chivalry at 27 (cited in note 23).
83 Id.
84 Id.
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Medieval war theorists accepted the rule of "bellum
Romanum" with all its horror of slaughter and enslavement, but
thought it should only apply to non-Christians and "pagans, like
the Muslims in the Holy Land or, in the sixteenth century, the
aboriginal peoples of the New World."85 Such wars against pagans were justified by religion-the Christianity of the warriors
and the pagan status of the enemy.
In the medieval period scholars asserted that the right to
fight a war, 'Jus ad bellum," required that it be "declared by a
competent authority, fought for a just cause, with proper intent
and a proportionality between provocation and response, and
toward the end of reestablishing peace."86 Implicit in this theory
was the belief that these rules justified a war and created the
theory of just war. But these rules did not regulate combat in
any meaningful way. There were some accepted codes of behavior, especially among knights and noblemen, but slaughter of
prisoners, other than knights and noblemen, was common.
Knights and noblemen were expected to take each other prisoner, treat prisoners humanely, and eventually allow them to be
ransomed.87 Towns might still be pillaged and leveled if they
refused to surrender and their inhabitants might be justly
slaughtered.88
Under the theory of a "just war" (pp 17-19), if God was on
their side and their cause was always righteous, soldiers might
do anything and cause vast carnage. The danger with such a
theory, as Witt notes, is that "just wars risked plunging warfare
into uncontrollable cycles of destruction" (p 17). If an army believed its mission was sanctioned by God, and that its adversaries were the enemies of God, then almost any sort of destruction was permissible. Just-war theory might have been workable
for wars against heathens, infidels, or other non-Christians, but
within Christian Europe it was increasingly difficult to make
the claim that God preferred one group of Catholics over another, or after the Protestant Reformation, one group of Christians
over another, and that unrestrained slaughter of one side by the
85

Id at 28.

86 Stacey, The Age of Chivalry at 30 (cited in note 23) (describing the circumstances
in which war could be waged in the Middle Ages).
87 See id at 36-38.
88 See Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in Howard, Andreopoulos, and
Shulman, Laws of W4ar 40, 50 (cited in note 21) (describing numerous examples of towns
sacked and plundered and civilians slaughtered in seventeenth-century Europe, all "according to the laws of war").
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other was permissible. As Witt demonstrates, the trick for international law theorists such as Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, and most of all Emmerich de Vattel, was to set out rules that
restrained-even civilized-warfare and limited its destructive
nature to encounters between soldiers and armies (p 18).
The accomplishments of these theorists were limited, and
most of their successes were probably due to practical considerations and the ever increasing costs of warfare in life and treasure. As armies became professionalized, the cost of training and
hiring soldiers became more expensive and rulers had an economic incentive for limiting death in war time. The increasing
use of cannons and guns also made the soldiers themselves more
concerned about limiting the human costs of warfare. Edged
weapons simply had not been as lethal as the newer ones, and
professional soldiers had an ongoing interest in the rules of war,
in contrast to foot soldiers of the medieval world, who were often
conscripted under systems of feudal obligation.
As Witt notes later in his book, even as Western society
moved away from reliance on the idea of a just war, appeals to
God and righteousness in war time continued. This should not
surprise us. In times of crisis people often appeal to the supernatural for aid. War is surely a great crisis. As the saying goes,
"there are no atheists in the fox holes."89 But, it is important to

understand that appeals to God were not the same as claims
that a nation's military activities were endorsed by God and
thus, in the medieval sense, anything done in warfare to further
God's will was permissible.
Thus, Americans during the Revolution adopted the slogan
"rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God." Significantly, the most
likely author of this phrase was Benjamin Franklin, a deist who
rejected traditional Christian faith.90 Likewise, Jefferson,
another deist, appealed to "Nature's God" in the Declaration
of Independence,91 but not to any serious theological basis for

89 This phrase is attributed to various people, most commonly to the World War II
correspondent Ernie Pyle. Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines 263 (Doubleday 1942).
90 The origin of this phase is contested. The best evidence is that Benjamin Franklin made it up, but attributed it as the epitaph to the regicide judge John Bradshaw. See
Monroe E. Deutsch, E Pluribus Ununt, 18 Classical J 387, 403 (1923). See also Rebellion
to Tyrants Is Obedience to God, 14 Wm & Mary Q 37, 37-38 (1905). Curiously, while discussing various versions of this quotation, Professor Witt does not note its origins (pp
41-43).
91 United States Declaration of Independence 1 (1776).
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independence or the war against Britain. Similarly, during the
Civil War, Lincoln referred to God's will to explain the carnage
of the Civil War. In his Second Inaugural, Lincoln noted that:
[I]f God wills that [the War] continue, until all the wealth
piled by the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood
drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with
the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it
must be said "the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether."92
Such language appealed to the overwhelmingly Protestant
North, but it was hardly the language of the pious or devout.
Lincoln himself had very little use for organized churches or
traditional Christianity.93
To talk about a war in religious terms during the Revolution
or in the nineteenth century was not a reversion to medieval
just-war theory. Rather, it was a reflection of what modern
scholars call "civil religion."94 Unfortunately, in this very good
book Witt does not explore the religious nature of the Civil War,
and the way in which partisans on both sides appealed to Godthe same God-to justify their carnage. As Lincoln noted in his
Second Inaugural, when the war began:
Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray
to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a
just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat
of other men's faces; but let us judge not that we be not
judged. The prayers of both could not be answered; that of
neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own
purposes. 9 5
Lincoln's appeals to scripture and his references to "The
Almighty" did not turn the Civil War into a holy war or lead to
notions of a just-war theory, which permitted slaughter in the
92 Abraham Lincoln, Second InauguralAddress, in Roy P. Basler, ed, 8 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 332, 333 (Rutgers 1953).
93 See Ward H. Lamon, The Life of Abraham Lincoln; front His Birth to His Inauguration as President 494 (Osgood 1872).
94 Mark Tushnet, Civil Religion, in Paul Finkelman, Religion and American Law:
An Encyclopedia 85-87 (Garland 2000).
95 Lincoln, Second Inauguralat 333 (cited in note 92).
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name of God. Rather, we should see that in wartime, Americans,
like people from most other nations, seek solace in religion and
believe in a moral justification for the wars they fight. Thus,
since the mid-nineteenth century the notion of just war or a
morally justifiable war for Americans has not been theologically
rooted or especially tied to any faith. Rather, such concepts have
been tied to notions of morality in the hoped-for outcome (such
as removing a brutal Spanish imperial presence in the SpanishAmerican War), destroying a deeply immoral enemy (such as defeating Nazism, with all of its horrors, in World War II), saving
others from Communist tyranny (such as in Korea and Vietnam), protecting a weak nation from the predatory acts of a
stronger nation (such as the Gulf War, which is also called Operation Desert Storm), or saving the world from the threat of
mass destruction by a brutal dictator (such as President George
W. Bush's public justification for the war in Iraq).96
The transformation of the Civil War into a "good war" (as
opposed to application of medieval just-war theory) helps us better understand the importance and necessity of the Lieber Code.
The South seceded to protect slavery,97 and white Southerners
were willing to fight a brutal war to preserve the right to hold
other people in bondage.98 Northerners went to war to preserve
the Union, but it soon became a war to end slavery as well.
Northerners accepted a modern notion of a just war-or a good
war, as I have referred to it-that allowed for the destruction of
slavery, but never contemplated the medieval notion that they
could destroy the enemy, the slaveowners themselves. At least
part of the transformation from a war to preserve the Union to a
war to destroy slavery was religious, although not necessarily
theological. Similarly, the evolution of the United States Army's
marching song from "John Brown's Body" to the language of the

96 I do not necessarily believe that all of these claims and justifications were legitimate or based on any sort of empirical evidence. My only point is to note the kinds of justifications used to legitimize various wars.
97 Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of
South Carolina fron the Federal Union (1861), in John Amasa May and Joan Reynolds
Faunt, South CarolinaSecedes 76, 80 (South Carolina 1960).
98 As Lincoln observed in his second inaugural address: "It may seem strange that
any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the
sweat of other men's faces, but let us judge not, that we be not judged." Lincoln, Second
Inaugural at 333 (cited in note 92). See also Paul Finkelman, States' Rights, Southern
Hypocrisy, and the Crisis of the Union, 45 Akron L Rev 449, 477 (2012).
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"Battle Hymn of the Republic"99 helps us understand the nature
of this change.100
Since both sides had a "moral" reason for the warSoutherners to preserve slavery and white supremacy 0 1 and
Northerners to save their nation from the lawless destruction of
the slaveholding secessionists and end human bondage-the potential for a war of vengeance and wanton destruction was
great. Some Southern combatants, such as the Younger-James
Gang, Quantrill's raiders, and troops under the command of Jubal Early behaved this way when they invaded the North and
when they conducted guerilla activities in the loyal slave
states. 102 In 1863, for example, Quantrill's terrorist forces murdered over 150 unarmed men in Kansas.103 Similarly, Confederate troops at Fort Pillow and elsewhere slaughtered surrendering US troops, murdering those who had actually surrendered
and been captured, killing wounded soldiers in hospitals, and
actually burying alive some wounded solders.104 Some of the soldiers were robbed, with any money and other valuables taken
from them, before they were murdered. Most of those murdered
at Fort Pillow were black, but some white soldiers and officers

99 Julia Ward Howe, The Battle Hymn of the Republic, in Atlantic Monthly (Oitson
1890).
100 Thus the marching song has such language as "[m]ine eyes have seen the glory of
the coming of the Lord" and "he died to make men holy, let us die to make men free." The
refrain "Glory, Glory, Hallelujah! His truth is marching on" is deeply Protestant. See id.
101 See Part VII.
102 The activities of Southern irregulars, like the murderous violence of the
Quantrill's Raiders and the Younger-James Gang in Missouri illustrate this. See notes
145-46 (discussing how Southern generals demanded tribute from Northern towns and
authorized Southern soldiers to hunt down and enslave Northern citizens). See also Part
V; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 757 (Oxford 1988)
(describing how Early's troops burned property of politicians in Maryland, demanded
what amounted to "protection money" from towns in Maryland, stole private property,
and even drank up the wine cellar of the father of Lincoln's postmaster general); Everard
H. Smith, Chambersburg:Anatomy of a Confederate Reprisal, 96 Am Hist Rev 432, 435
(1991) (describing troops under Early demanding "protection money" from the town of
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and when the money was not paid, burning the city to the
ground). For a discussion of Younger-James and Quantrill, see McPherson, Battle Cry of
Freedom at 784-88 (cited in note 102).
103 Phillip Shaw Paludan, "A People's Contest": The Union and Ciivil War 301 (Harper & Row 1988).
104 See John Cimprich, Fort Pillow, a Civil Wiar Massacre, and Public Memory 8184, 89, 95 (LSU 2011); Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm 175 (Kansas 1987). For an
example of burying captured prisons alive, or allowing wounded prisoners to die untreated after the battle, see George S. Burkhardt, Confederate Rage, Yankee Wrath: No Quarter in the Civil War 114 (Southern Illinois 2007).
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were also murdered after they surrendered.105 One Confederate
officer described the events at Fort Pillow as "the most horrible
sight that I have ever witnessed."106 A Confederate sergeant reported that "[t]he slaughter was awful" and that the captured
fort became "a great slaughter pen. Blood, human blood stood
about in pools and brains could have been gathered up in any
quantity," as unarmed men with their hands in the air were shot
at point-blank range or hacked to death with swords.107
Such actions taken against surrendering enemies, hospitalized unarmed soldiers, and those who had already surrendered
violated codes of behavior-both written and unwritten-that
dated from the medieval period.
That Confederate generals not only approved but encouraged such behavior indicates the potential for the Civil War to
have returned to an era of barbarity. The Lieber Code was in
part a response to Southern lawlessness, such as Southern
troops enslaving Northern free blacks, and enslaving or murdering captured black troops, and also an attempt to prevent lawless pillaging by Northern troops as they invaded the South.
Thus, the Lieber Code can be seen as a way of preventing war
(the Civil War or any war) from spinning out of control into a holy crusade that devolves into a bloodbath. Clearly, while the medieval notions of just war have disappeared, the tension between a
"crusade" and war as policy and politics has never disappeared.108
III. TOWARD A MODERN LAW OF WAR
Beyond this discussion of just war and the medieval period,
Witt offers a solid discussion of the application of the law of war
in North America, in the context of wars with Indians during the
colonial and revolutionary periods, and in the wars against
Great Britain (the American Revolution and War of 1812) (pp
15-27, 67-74). He teaches us much about the debates between
Burkhardt, Confederate Rage, Yankee W4rath at 113 (cited in note 104).
Id at 110.
107 Cimprich, Fort Pillow, a Civil War Massacre at 81 (cited in note 104).
108 Consider the title of the most important officer's memoir of World War II, Dwight
David Eisenhower. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Doubleday 1948). During
the Iraq War there were numerous comments about it being a "crusade" against the
Muslim world. See Jackson Lears, How a War Became a Crusade, NY Times A25 (Mar
11, 2003); Washington's Blog, "Winning Hearts and Minds": America's Holy Crusade
Continues
in
Iraq
(Global
Research
Jan
18,
2010),
online
at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/winning-hearts-and-minds-america-s-holy-crusade-continues
105

106

-in-iraq (visited Nov 24, 2013).
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the Americans and British over prisoners of war during the Revolution and more complicated debates about the use of the law of
war against Indians (pp 22-27, 335-36). Similarly, conflicts between the United States and Britain over embargoes, the interdiction of ships at sea, and the impressment of sailors in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries all involved arguments and interpretations of the law of war and the accepted
concepts of diplomacy. Witt's research demonstrates-although
it is not necessarily his thesis-that in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries Americans and Europeans threw theories of international law and war at each other during negotiations over prisoners of war, reparations, and treaties, but claims
under these theories of law and war were often mostly tactical.
Thus, before the War of 1812 the United States strenuously opposed the maritime policies of both France and Britain that interfered with neutral shipping because the United States was
neutral. But in the Civil War the United States reversed course,
using its blockade of Southern ports against all shipping (pp
144-57). A nation might denounce blockades in one war and insist on their legitimacy in another.
However, as Witt shows, the struggle to have a rational law
of war-the emergence of modern rules-came to the fore in the
American Civil War. Under the Lieber Code, as well as modern

rules of war, civilian deaths should be avoided where possible
(although necessity allows for attacking cities even though civilian deaths might be astronomical);109 captured civilians may not
be killed, tortured, or enslaved;11o prisoners of war should be
treated decently, fed, housed safely, and not tortured;111 no army
may use poison;112 the assassination of rulers is generally
frowned upon; 113 flags of truce are to be recognized;114 spies may

109 See Lieber Code Art 15, 22 (cited in note 22). See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art 3, 1955 6 UST 3516, 3521,
TIAS No 3365 (1949) (stating that the sick and wounded of the enemy should be cared
for with humanity).
110 See Lieber Code Art 23 (cited in note 22).
111 See Lieber Code Art 56 (cited in note 22). See also Geneva Convention, Art 3,
1955 6 UST at 3521 (cited in note 109).
112 See Lieber Code Art 70 (cited in note 22).
113 Lieber Code Art 148 (cited in note 22). See generally Mark V. Vlasic, Assassinations and Targeted Killings-A Historical and Post-Bin Laden Legal Analysis, 43
Georgetown J Intl L 259 (2012).
114 Lieber Code Art 114 (cited in note 22).
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be summarily executed;115 prisoners of war can be exchanged or
paroled (but do not have to be);116 and civilian property and the
property of a conquered nation should generally be respected
(although an invading force may take or destroy the property of
its enemies under a variety of circumstances).117 Indeed, even
the killing of enemy soldiers is subject to the limitation that
such killings are necessary to win a battle, protect your own soldiers, or win a war. Thus for example, the allied forces in the
Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) in 1991 abruptly stopped
fighting when the Iraqi Army was utterly defenseless and in full
retreat. 118 Continued fighting would have led to unnecessary killing that would have served no purpose, since the goals of the
war had been achieved, and unilateral cessation of combat could
lead to an end to the fighting.
These rules seem logical and are so well accepted in our own
times that they seem unremarkable. But as Witt demonstrates,
all of this is relatively modern (p 130). For most of human history invading armies enslaved or killed their enemies whether civilians or soldiers, taking or destroying everything in sight, and
inflicting enormous cruelty on enemies, merely for the sake of
doing so, as revenge, to provide payment for soldiers, to recoup
the costs of fighting the war, or to frighten other towns or armies
into immediately surrendering.

Modern international law and the law of war, including the
rules of the Geneva Conventions,119 condemn and criminalize
such behavior. Some of these kinds of behavior were also criminalized by customary international law before the American Civil War. Modern trials for war crimes, which started after the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, in part reflected the
collective belief that those countries had egregiously violated accepted rules of warfare.120 Most of these modern rules began in
115 See Lieber Code Art 95 (cited in note 22). See also Geneva Convention, Art 5,
1955 6 UST at 3522 (cited in note 109).
116 See Lieber Code Art 119 (cited in note 22). See also Geneva Convention, Art 21, 6
UST at 3336 (cited in note 109).
117 See Lieber Code Art 38 (cited in note 22).
118 See Andrew Rosenthal, MilitaryAims Met, NY Times Al (Feb 28, 1991).
119 Geneva Convention, Art 129, 1955 6 UST at 3570 (cited in note 109).
120 The earliest war crimes trial may be that of Sir Peter of Hagenbach in 1474. See
Georg Schwarzenberger, A Forerunnerof Nuremberg: The Breisach Wiar Crime Trial of
1474, The Manchester Guardian 4 (Sept 28, 1946). I am indebted to Jonathan Bush for
providing me with this source. There were also sporadic war-crimes trials in the nineteenth century. In the aftermath of the Dakota War a military commission sentenced
303 Dakota warriors to death, most for merely participating in the war. President
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the American Civil War with the drafting of Lieber's remarkable
code.
Witt points out that the project of earlier legal theorists,
starting with Vitoria, Grotius, and Vattel, was to place limits on
warfare in order to reduce bloodshed and suffering. These writers would have limited the way armies could fight, the tactics
they might use, and even the means of warfare. Vattel argued
for "the gentlest methods" of warfare in the name of humanity
(p 18).
But, as Witt persuasively argues, there is tension between
humanitarian limitations on warfare and a humane outcome.
Witt demonstrates the irony that a restrained war using "the
gentlest methods" may in fact be less humanitarian than a war
that unleashes massive power as quickly and as intensely as
possible. For more than half a millennium some scholars, philosophers, and theorists of war have argued that virtually unrestrained war would be quicker and in the end more humane. Nicolai Machiavelli "called for wars that were 'short and strong'
('corte e grosse,' he said)," while Frederick the Great argued for
wars that were "short and lively" (p 184). Clausewitz, the greatest of all war theorists, argued that the idea of a law of war to
restrain nations was inherently absurd: "War is thus an act of
force to compel our enemy to do our will."121 In order to attain
this object fully, "we must render the enemy powerless; and
that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare."122 In 1855, just a half
decade before the American Civil War would begin, Montague
Bernard, the Chichele Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Oxford, argued that intense warfare would "make
the calamity shorter at the cost of making it fiercer and more
terrible."123

Lieber enthusiastically adopted these ideas in the Lieber
Code, but as I note below, with some significant caveats. He
Lincoln effectively pardoned 265 of these men. The rest were executed because they were
believed to have committed crimes during the war-"war crimes"-such as rape, killing
civilians, and killing captured prisoners. See Paul Finkelman, "I Could Not Afford to
Hang Men for Votes." Lincoln the Lawyer, HumanitarianConcerns, and the Dakota Pardons, 39 Wm Mitchell L Rev 405, 413 (2013). After the Civil War the United States tried
and executed Henry Wirz, the commander of the Andersonville prisoner of war camp, for
his savage and sadistic treatment of prisoners of war and his refusal to provide them
clean water and even a minimal amount of food necessary to survive (pp 298-301).
121 Clausewitz, On War at 75 (cited in note 17).
122 Id.
123 See Montague Bernard, The Growth of Laws and Usages of 14ar, in Oxford Essays 88, 134 (Parker 1856).
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declared that "[t]he more vigorously wars are pursued[,] the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief."124 This was pure
Clausewitz.125 But while accepting the importance of harsh and
vigorous warfare, Lieber also successfully managed to create
rules that would simultaneously reduce some of the inherent
cruelty of war. Thus, the Lieber Code asserted that nations
could ban some weapons or tactics-such as the use of poison,126
intentionally harming "the inoffensive citizen of the hostile
country,"127 or retaliation for the purpose of revenge. 128
But, in such modern sharp wars, Lieber defended the proposition that "no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to
injure the enemy is any longer admitted."129 Outside of the rules
Lieber laid down, war could, and should, be prosecuted with the
utmost ferocity. "When war is begun," he told his students at Columbia, "the best and most humane thing is to carry it on as intensely as possible so as to be through with it as soon as possible" (p 235). Here was the argument for "sharp wars."130
American military strategists may have invented the term
"shock and awe" in the 1990s,131 and applied it in Iraq in 2003,
but the concept dates at least to Clausewitz, if not Machiavelli.
The concept was first articulated in the United States not by the
second Bush administration, but by the leading legal theorist of
the Lincoln administration.
Historically, there were few restraints on war and warriors.
Captured soldiers might be killed, tortured, or enslaved, cities
might be leveled, and an enemy's property could be confiscated.
The struggle for the modern world, as Witt sets out, has been
how to rein in the gods of war, to reduce terror and needless destruction of life and property, while at the same time allowing
nations to conduct policy "by other means."132
Not surprisingly, Witt takes us through the law of war in
the ancient and medieval periods pretty quickly. His focus is the
United States and more recent times. His discussion of attempts
Lieber Code Art 29 (cited in note 22).
See Clausewitz, On War at 77 (cited in note 17) ("[W]ar is an act of force, and
there is no logical limit to the application of that force.").
126 Lieber Code Art 70 (cited in note 22).
127 Lieber Code Art 25 (cited in note 22).
128 Lieber Code Art 28 (cited in note 22).
129 Lieber Code Art 30 (cited in note 22).
130 Lieber Code Art 29 (cited in note 22).
131 Harlan Ullman and James P. Wade Jr, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Doninance XX (National Defense, 1996).
132 Clausewitz, On War at 87 (cited in note 17).
124
125
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to regulate war in the colonial and revolutionary periods is fascinating. Debates over the treatment of prisoners, prisoner exchanges, blockades of ports, the use of privateers, impressment
of sailors, and the confiscation or destruction of civilian property
swirled around the Revolution and the War of 1812.
Witt argues that the great tension over the law of war is between "humanitarianism and the ideal of justice" (p 7). The first
would lead to limited war that tried to minimize civilian death,
collateral damage, and even the killing of enemy soldiers. To
achieve this goal, Witt argues that for the last two-and-half centuries, "the laws of war have sought to minimize the horrors of
war by inviting war's participants to temporarily set aside the
conviction that their cause is right" (p 7). But this comes in tension with the second ideal-"justice"-which allows enemies to
destroy each other because each side believes in the righteousness of its cause. Witt wisely does not claim that this tension is
"unique to American history" (p 8), but he focuses on the United
States because he argues that "particular features of the United
States experience," including the way the United States has
fought wars, "have created distinctive patterns in the nation's
history" (p 8).
IV. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF WAR
Witt's argument fits into a long-standing debate among
American historians (and other scholars) over what is generally
known as "American exceptionalism." The first wave of "exceptionalists" argued that American development fundamentally
differed from the rest of the world because the United States
lacks a feudal past, was populated by immigrants, was cut off
from Europe and developed more or less in isolation for nearly a
century, has always been a liberal democracy, and has enormous
natural resources. This sort of argument was dramatically developed by, among others, Louis Hartz and Daniel Boorstin.133 At
its best, this kind of argument points out the real distinctions
between the flow of US history and that of many other nations.
At its worst, this kind of argument leads to a jingoist hyperpatriotism. Global historians have often taken issue with the
claims. Marxists and other scholars on the left are particularly
uncomfortable with such claims because American exceptionalism
133 See generally Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (Harcourt 1955);
Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The DemocraticExperience (Random House 1973).
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denies the existence of social class, downplays conflict within the
nation, often ignores American imperial adventures, and in the
hands of some scholars, ignores the huge problem of slavery and
race. 134
Witt's book offers a less self-congratulatory notion of exceptionalism that is worth exploring. Witt's claim for exceptionalism could have been easily rooted in the very fact that the modern law of war began in the United States, with the
promulgation of the Lieber Code. Almost every subsequent international agreement on the treatment of prisoners, the prohibition of certain kinds of weapons, the treatment of civilians,
and the disposition of civilian property can be traced to the
Lieber Code. Lieber did not invent all of these ideas, and indeed
much of what he included in the Lieber Code had been part of
customary international law or set out in the works of other theorists. But Lieber put all these strands together in one place,
added to them, and forcefully indicated that enslavement was no
longer acceptable by civilized people. Thus, long before the
Hague and Geneva Conventions regulating the use of poison gas
and the treatment of prisoners, Lieber set out rules against torture of prisoners,135 or the intentional mistreatment of prisoners
of war, and the use of poison,136 as well as guidelines for adequately feeding prisoners of war and ensuring that they are
"treated with humanity."137 Indeed, the recent history of the
United States bears out the continued validity and intellectual
power of the Lieber Code. Part of the justification for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 could be traced to Lieber's explicit
ban on the use of poison: the United States knew that Iraq had
used poison gas against Iran and against its own civilians, and
the United States believed that Iraq was developing weapons of
"mass destruction," which are a modern equivalent of poison.138
134 For a discussion of race in the context of American exceptionalism, see Seymour
Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism:A Double-Edged Sword 113-50 (Norton 1996).
135 Lieber Code Art 56 (cited in note 22). The Geneva Convention later established
protections for prisoners of war in 1949. Geneva Convention, Art 13, 1955 6 UST at 3524
(cited in note 109).
136 See Lieber Code Art 70 (cited in note 22). The Hague Declaration of 1899 and the
Hague Convention of 1907 banned use of poison and asphyxiating gas. James Brown
Scott, ed, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 225 (Oxford 1918).
137 Lieber Code Art 76 (cited in note 22).
138 See George W. Bush, Operation Iraqi Freedom, White House Radio Address Archives (Mar 22, 2003), online at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news
/releases/2003/03/20030322.html (visited Nov 24, 2013). The fact that no such weapons of
mass destruction existed is beside the point; the Bush administration justified the war
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Thus, President George W. Bush relied on popular opposition to
such practices to justify his invasion of Iraq.139 On the other
hand, to the shock of the American people, the Bush administration authorized (and publicly defended) the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques," which many Americans believed constituted torture. 140 Such behavior, of course, clearly violated the
Lieber Code.
But, Witt's claim is not merely based on the fact that the
Lieber Code came from the United States. He stresses the importance of slavery in the development of American attitudes
towards the law of war. Before turning to this argument, it is
important to emphasize-as Witt does not-that the War Department wanted the code for many reasons. The War Department and especially General Henry W. Halleck, wanted rules to
govern civilian property, the treatment of prisoners, and especially the horrible and gory guerilla warfare in places like Missouri, where Halleck had been in command earlier in the War.
Indeed, the code must be seen as part of an evolving law of war
that Lieber helped create in 1861 and 1862 when he wrote about
guerilla warfare and the treatment of captured Confederates.
Slavery is of course an important component of this, because
emancipation involved the confiscation of billions of dollars
worth of property. While Witt focuses most of his attention on

slavery, he seems oddly surprised that slavery affected American foreign policy and the American notion of the law of war in
the period before the Civil War. Furthermore, he argues that the
Lieber Code should really be "Lincoln's Code" because of Lincoln's opposition to slavery (p 8). As I will note below, it should
not surprise anyone that slavery was central to American policy
making from the Revolution to the Civil War. Similarly, it is
clear that a prohibition of slavery was only one component of the
Lieber Code and the American development of a law of war.
However, given Lieber's own hostility to slavery-and the fact
that Lincoln had nothing to do with the creation of the Lieber
Code-the story here is Lieber's and not Lincoln's. My point here
is not to quibble over the title of the book, but rather to argue

on their existence, which reflected the ethos of the Lieber Code that poison was
unexpected.
139 Id.
140 US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President: Re: Standardsof Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340 2340A 2-27 (Aug 1, 2002).
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that the American code of war, which became the basis of the
world's code of war, was not the result of a grand plan by Lincoln. Rather, it was a response to the changing nature of warfare
that emerged during the Civil War, and the vision of the author
of the code, and not his commander-in-chief.
V. THE LIEBER CODE
Lieber wrote the Lieber Code at the request of Major General Henry W. Halleck, the general-in-chief of the army in 1862.
Halleck needed a field manual to guide officers as his armies
marched into the South to defeat the Confederacy. Lieber's response balanced humanitarian concerns (bans on torture, killing
captured soldiers, or using poison) with an understanding that
wars should be pursued with vigor and intensity.141 This view of
war comported with the notions of Machiavelli, Frederick the
Great, and Clausewitz-and as Professor Witt correctly notes,
Lincoln. Lieber, like Lincoln, favored a ferocious war in which
the ability of the enemy to make war was destroyed. At the same
time, his rules prohibited unnecessary destruction of property
and required the army to attempt to preserve and never purposefully destroy works of art, libraries, churches, schools, and
scientific instruments.142 Such items might, however, be seized
by the army and kept for disposition after the war. 143 The Lieber
Code specifically prohibited soldiers from taking public or private property for their personal use as booty or trophies of war.
Neither officers nor enlisted men were to profit from the property they might seize on behalf of the government. 144 In these and
many other ways, Lieber set out a code that comported with the
needs of modern armies to limit collateral damage as much as
possible, legitimize damage where it was necessary, allow for
the nation-state (as embodied by the United States Army) to
take enemy property (such as food) for the use of the army, destroy enemy property used to make war, and prevent the soldiers of the army from becoming a mob of looters and pillagers.
At the same time the Lieber Code also empowered the United States Army to end slavery wherever it found people in bondage. The Lieber Code emphatically declared that slavery could
no longer exist and that the army would use its power to end
See Part III.
142 Lieber Code Art 34-38, 118 (cited in note 22).
143 Lieber Code Art 35-36 (cited in note 22).
144 Lieber Code Art 46 (cited in note 22).
141
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slavery.145 Thus, the Lieber Code can be seen as the legislation
or rules used to implement the Emancipation Proclamation.
But while property could not be taken for private gain,
Lieber found nothing wrong with the army taking food and other
goods necessary to support itself. Foraging was permissible under the Lieber Code.146 Significantly, Lieber wrote the Lieber
Code before General William Tecumseh Sherman began his famous March to the Sea, where to some extent his troops lived off
the land.
Southerners may still rage over Sherman's March. Witt
condemns the behavior of the United States Army and (wrongly,
I think) blames the Lieber Code for it (p 252). Oddly, as I note
below, Witt seems oblivious to much worse behavior by Confederate troops, including the enslavement of free black Northerners. 147 While some behavior by individual US soldiers violated
the Lieber Code and military regulations, most of the destruction that came with Sherman's March was consistent with the
nature of modern war, which often necessitates the destruction
of the ability of the enemy to make war. 148 It was also consistent
with the law of war as set out by Lieber. The author of the
Lieber Code generally approved of Sherman's March to the Sea,
although he was concerned about the level of destruction and
individual pillaging (which of course violated the Lieber Code).
Significantly, Lieber privately observed that "ruthless burning,
killing," and other crimes "demoralize[] an army" (p 280). However, this observation may not have been wholly correct. Confederate soldiers gleefully destroyed property in the North, enslaved
free
blacks,
and
enthusiastically
slaughtered
surrendering black soldiers at Fort Pillow (pp 257-58). Similarly, morale was high as Sherman's army smashed its way
through Georgia and into the Carolinas, consuming virtually
everything in its path. Some of these soldiers egregiously
Lieber Code Art 32 (cited in note 22).
Lieber Code Art 38 (cited in note 22).
147 See text accompanying notes 171-72.
148 When Southern soldiers invaded the North their behavior was similar, in terms
of destruction of property, but quite different-and much worse-in their behavior to
humans. Lee's troops burned property-most famously an iron forge owned by the abolitionist congressman Thaddeus Stevens. But his troops also seized free blacks to be
dragged back to the South as fugitive slaves. This sort of behavior-enslaving the citizens of an enemy nation-had generally not been considered legitimate warfare since
before the medieval period, except by colonizing forces, such as the Spanish in the New
World. See Scott L. Mingus Sr, The Louisiana Tigers in the Gettysburg Campaign: JuneJuly 1863 71-74, 82-97 (Louisiana State 2009).
145
146
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exceeded the needs of the military by illegally taking such nonnecessities as jewelry, silverware, money, or souvenirs.149 These
acts clearly violated the code as well as direct orders by officers
and were carried out in opposition to policies set by Sherman,
Oliver Otis Howard, and other generals. But, as Witt and other
scholars have pointed out, discipline often broke down during
the expeditions to forage for food, and officers were unable to effectively supervise all the men in the field collecting goods necessary to feed the army (pp 280-83). Discipline is of course the
responsibility of the commanders, and to the extent that Sherman, his corps commanders, and their subordinates failed to
maintain discipline, they are to be faulted. But the key point
here is that these activities were illegal, in violation of the
Lieber Code, and emphatically not the policy of the high command. In that way, the illegal acts of some of Sherman's soldiers
stand in sharp contrast to those of Confederate soldiers, who
acted under direct orders of their commanders (or as their officers looked on) as they pillaged and robbed Northern whites (and
captured US soldiers), enslaved Northern blacks whether free or
fugitive, murdered captured white officers from black regiments,
and murdered and enslaved captured US soldiers who were
black.150
The Lieber Code prohibited the acts of theft and private
plunder that marred Sherman's destruction of the heart of the
Confederacy and his decimation of slavery across the South.
However, none of these acts were sanctioned by United States
Army commanders, and none were part of US policy toward the
South. On the other hand, the Lieber Code explicitly sanctioned
the "destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other
persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the
armed contests of the war."11 The Lieber Code also condoned

foraging for food and "the appropriation of whatever an enemy's
country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the
army."152 Lieber understood that war involved killing soldiers in
battle and destroying the industrial infrastructure that the enemy used to support its war effort. The Lieber Code envisioned a
149 On the hunting of souvenirs by both armies, see Joan E. Cashin, Trophies of
4ar:Material Culture in the Civil War Era, 1 J Civil War Era 339, 340-41 (2011).
150 At Fort Pillow, Confederates murdered a "large number of civilians," including
children, black and white civilian men, and both white and black women. Burkhardt,
ConfederateRage, Yankee Wrath at 109-13, 117 (cited in note 104).
151 Lieber Code Art 15 (cited in note 22).
152 Id.
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harsh war, which Lincoln supported, designed to destroy the
ability of the enemy to continue the war:
Military necessity

. . . allows of the capturing of every

armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile
government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of
all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and
channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all
withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy. 153
But for all of this killing, Lieber also wanted American soldiers
to behave with restraint and not to take life unnecessarily, rape,
pillage, or enslave people. This was because "[m]en who take up
arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to
God."154

That some US soldiers harmed civilians and stole from them
does not diminish the value of the Lieber Code or its overall
goals. Like Clausewitz, Lieber believed "[t]he more earnestly
and keenly wars are carried on, the better for humanity, for
peace and civilization" (p 184). The Lieber Code did, however,
make a distinction between destroying or confiscating civilian
property that could be used for the war effort and theft, plunder,
needless destruction for its own sake, and harming civilians.
Noncombatants were not to be intentionally harmed, arrested,
executed, and certainly never enslaved. The occasional illegal
acts of some US soldiers simply underscore the horror of war
and the difficulty of maintaining discipline in combat.
Significantly, the policy of the United States under the
Lieber Code differed dramatically from the explicit policy and
actions of the Confederate high command. Obviously the Confederates did not accept the Lieber Code, and certainly did not
think it was binding on them. However, when Confederate armies invaded the North they acted in violation of the generally
accepted laws of war that Western nations had adhered to for
centuries, as well as the rules promulgated by the Confederacy.155

153 Id.

154 Id.
155 See, for example, Smith, 96 Am Hist Rev at 435 (cited in note 102) (describing
troops under Early demanding protection money from the town of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and when the money was not paid, burning the city to the ground).
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In Pennsylvania, Southern troops, with the full sanction of
their officers (including commanding generals), took money,
clothing, liquor, wine, cigars, and other nonmilitary items from
civilians.16 Such behavior was not the same as taking food or
military stores, which Sherman's army did in the South. Of
course some of Sherman's soldiers acted in this manner as well,
but there was a significant difference. Sherman's soldiers acted
in violation of orders and in violation of the Lieber Code, which
they were required to obey. And of course this also ran counter
to Sherman's own willingness to "punish looters in his own army."157 While marching through Georgia, Sherman ordered that
wagons with "plunder" in them be burned.18 While ordering his
soldiers to take food and forage, he also ordered them not to enter private homes,159 which was of course consistent with the
Lieber Code. These orders were routinely ignored and the army
did a very poor job of enforcing them. But, the important point
here is that the army was under orders not to behave in this
way, and these orders were supported by the new Lieber Code.
Confederate soldiers, on the other hand, acting under direct
supervision of their officers acted differently. Major General Jubal Early ordered Confederate soldiers to go out of their way to
destroy property owned by Congressman Thaddeus Stevens because of his famous opposition to slavery.6o In addition to burn-

ing Stevens's iron works, which might have been justified as a
way of undermining the war effort of the United States, Early's
troops burned civilian housing, smashed the homes of common
workers, "confiscated all movable property, and left the place a
shambles."161 This destruction was not based on any necessity of
undermining the ability of the United States to make war. Rather, it was an explicit form of retaliation for the congressman's
unflinching hostility to slavery. Similarly, in 1864, troops under
Brigadier General John McCausland, acting under directions
from Jubal Early (who had by this time become a Lt General),
burned Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, after residents of the
town refused to pay the Confederate army $600,000, in what can
156
157
158
159
160

See Mingus, The Louisiana Tigers at 82-97 (cited in note 148).
See Cashin, 1 J Civil War Era at 353 (cited in note 149).
Id.
Id at 354.

See Mingus, The Louisiana Tigers at 71-74 (cited in note 148). See also McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom at 757 (cited in note 102).
161 Hans L. Trefousse, Thaddeus Stevens: Nineteenth-Cen tury Egalitarian 134
(North Carolina 1997).
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only be considered protection money. 162 Chambersburg had absolutely no military value and did not threaten Confederate
troops. The raid was purely retaliatory, and General Early justified it because the US had burned crops and barns and other
buildings in the Shenandoah Valley.163 Indeed, it was a form of
terrorism that violated customary international law and generally accepted principles of military behavior.
Following the assault on Stevens's property, Early issued
orders that were at odds with generally accepted rules of war,
and were certainly at odds with Early's West Point education.
These acts violated Article 52 of the US Articles of War, first
promulgated in 1806, which was in force when the Civil War began. 164 The Confederacy adopted these rules "verbatim" in the
Regulations for the Army of the Confederate States.165 Thus
when General Early insisted that the town of Gettysburg pay
"tribute" to the Confederate army or face having the town
burned,166 he was violating Confederate regulations. At York he
demanded the city pay him $100,000 as tribute, as well as provide food, clothing, and other goods.167 This was not the action of
undisciplined troops, as happened when some of Sherman's soldiers, in violation of orders, stole from civilians. Rather this was
the action of a West Point-trained major general (who in civilian
life had been a lawyer), behaving as though he were commanding Caesar's legions in ancient Rome. Early, the other Southern
generals who acted in the same fashion, and General Robert E.
Lee, who countenanced this behavior, fully understood the accepted rules of warfare. At West Point these generals would
have studied international law and the laws of war, including
the work of Vattel and Chancellor James Kent (pp 85-86). In the
service they had been under the General Regulations for the Army 16 8 promulgated by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in 1821,
which obligated officers to act with "the dictates of humanity"169
when conducting sieges (p 86). The General Regulations "repeatedly

162 Smith, 96 Am Hist Rev at 435 (cited in note 102).
163 Id at 438.

164 Act of Apr 10, 1806, ch 20, 2 Stat 359.
165 Cashin, 1 J Civil War Era at 341 (cited in note 149). See also Articles of War Art
52, in Regulations for the Army of the Confederate States 417-18 (Randolph 1864).
166 See Mingus, The Louisiana Tigers at 76 (cited in note 148).
167 Id at 84-85.
168 J.C. Calhoun, General Regulations for the Army; or Military Institutes (Carey and

Sons 1821).
169 Id at 147.
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relied on and incorporated the 'usages of war' as they had developed since the eighteenth century" (p 86). Lee, Early, and other
senior Confederate officers knew that these usages of war prohibited needless destruction of private property, requiring tribute from civilians, or taking nonmilitary property from civilians.
They simply refused to follow them.
It is worth noting in passing that many of these illegal acts
by Confederates took place after the promulgation of the Lieber
Code, which indicated what the United States expected of its
soldiers. In other words, the United States was on record that its
soldiers should live up to a code that prohibited theft from civilians and absolutely opposed requiring tribute from towns and
cities. The Confederates, however, were not willing to accept
such constraints. It is also important to recall that the Confederate invasions of Maryland1o and Pennsylvania took place well
before Sherman's March.
More important than the taking of property or the attempts
to levy tribute from captured cities are the instances of Confederate troops kidnapping Northern whites to hold as hostages or
for retaliation and the enslavement of free blacks in the North.171
Such behavior violated all notions of usages of war as understood at the time. In 1862, and later in the Gettysburg campaign, Southern troops kidnapped free blacks and dragged them
to the South as slaves.172 As one historian has recently noted,
"Some of the enemy soldiers who came north in June 1863 hunted down people of color to send south into slavery."173 Blacks
throughout southeastern Pennsylvania fled from Confederate
soldiers who hunted them down to enslave them. This contrasts
sharply with the Lieber Code and with the behavior of US troops

170 "During the 1862 Maryland campaign, Stonewall Jackson captured Harpers Ferry, where hundreds of contrabands had gathered after escaping from their owners. Many
Confederates noted approvingly that Jackson's force had recovered escaped slaves as
well as capturing thousands of Union soldiers." Gary W. Gallagher, "The Progress of Our
Arms": Whither Civil War Military History? 40-41 (44th Annual Robert Fortenbaugh
Memorial Lecture, Gettysburg College 2005).
171 Ted Alexander, 'A Regular Slave Hunt": The Army of Northern Virginia and
Black Civilians in the Gettysburg Campaign, 4 North & South 82, 84 (2001).
172 Id at 84-89. See also Gallagher, "The Progress of Our Arms" at 40-41 (cited in
note 170). See generally David G. Smith, Race and Retaliation: The Capture of African
Americans during the Gettysburg Campaign, in Peter Wallenstein and Bertram WyattBrown, eds, Virginia's Civil War 137 (Virginia 2005).
173 Margaret S. Creighton, The Colors of Courage: Gettysburg's Forgotten History,
IInmigrants, Women, and African Americans in the Civil War's Defining Battle viii (Basic
Books 2005).
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and all other armies in the Western world at that time. Rather,
it is reminiscent of the practices of the armies of the ancient
world.174 It is also worth noting that despite Confederate complaints about Lincoln starting a servile war, when roaming in
the North Confederate troops were busy rounding up free people. Furthermore, many of the first blacks to fight for the United
States were not recently emancipated slaves but free men from
the North and from Louisiana.175
The behavior of the Confederates in trying to enslave free
blacks illustrates the striking contrast between the United
States, and the Lieber Code under which it operated, and the
Confederates, who denounced the code. This history is important
for better understanding the value of the Lieber Code and also
puts some of Witt's critiques of the Lieber Code in greater perspective. Witt notes that the Lieber Code failed to prevent acts
of plunder by Sherman's troops. He further claims that the
Lieber Code set the stage for the horrible behavior of the army
that led to devastations of Indians during and after the Civil
War and atrocities during the Philippine insurrection in the early twentieth century (pp 355-56). But, when compared to the actions of the Confederate officers in demanding tribute, kidnapping and enslaving civilians, and egregiously destroying
property for political, rather than military, purposes, the value

of the Lieber Code in humanizing war and moderating the conflict becomes clearer. Under generally accepted rules of war that
most Confederate officers would have learned at West Point, the
taking of civilian property, or its destruction, could only be justified by military necessity, and not as an act of vengeance, political retaliation, or for personal profit or greed. Thus, while the
Confederates could have justified destroying the iron foundry
owned by Thaddeus Stevens as necessary to prevent the production of military goods from iron, the Confederates could not justify burning the foundry merely because Stevens was an antislavery Congressman, which was their stated reason for doing
this. Nor did any military code justify the burning of Chambersburg in 1864, merely as revenge for actions by the US Army in
Virginia.

174 Although such practices would be revived by Germany in World War II, who enslaved millions of Europeans, and the Soviets, who held untold numbers of German prisoners of war in slave-like conditions in the Gulag.
175 See Paludan, "A People's Contest" at 211-12 (cited in note 103).
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More important for understanding the value of the Lieber
Code and the behavior of the Confederates is the kidnapping
and enslavement of Northern citizens by the Confederate armies. The Confederates seceded to protect slavery,176 and thus
when given the opportunity, they used their armies to enslave
people. The Lieber Code specifically declared that slavery was
forbidden, and that "[p]rivate citizens are no longer murdered,
enslaved, or carried off."177 Thus, under the Lieber Code the US

Army destroyed slavery in much of the South. Sherman's March
to the Sea in 1864-1865 constituted the greatest liberation of
human beings in the history of the world until the allied armies
marched on Berlin in 1944-1945.
As I have noted, Professor Witt condemns the behavior of
Sherman's troops in Georgia but oddly does not consider the actions of Confederate generals who collected tribute and protection money from Northern towns or more strikingly ordered the
enslavement of Northerners. War is indeed hell, but in this war
only one side believed it was permissible to kidnap and enslave
the civilians of the other side. Witt claims that Lincoln was reluctant to move against slavery or enlist black troops because of
the fear of it would lead to barbaric warfare or "servile" war (p
199). But the reality is that the Confederates were practicing
barbaric warfare by enslaving Northerners before the Emancipation Proclamation and expanded these policies, along with the
mistreatment of captured US soldiers, after the Emancipation
Proclamation. The Lieber Code was a major step forward in
making war less hellish, with its specific provisions banning any
kind of slavery, insisting on equal treatment for all soldiers
without regard to their race, prohibiting the destruction of cultural properties (like libraries), proscribing the needless taking
or destruction of private property, and providing specific provisions for the humane treatment of prisoners. At the same time,
the Lieber Code allowed and even anticipated the harsh war of
Clausewitz and Machiavelli.
VI. LINCOLN, EMIANCIPATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
The kidnapping and enslavement of free blacks in the North
by Confederate troops lead to a better understanding of Lieber's
work, its connection to slavery, and one of the major arguments
176 See Finkelman, 45 Akron L Rev at 477-78 (cited in note 98).
177

Lieber Code Art 23 (cited in note 22).
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of Professor Witt. It also leads to a major weakness of Witt's
book. Witt argues, correctly, that American foreign and military
policy before the Civil War was almost always designed to protect slavery. But he fails to recognize that in both the Revolution
and the War of 1812 the United States had enlisted thousands of
blacks, many of whom were manumitted by their masters just so
they could serve in the army. 178 Furthermore, he fails to recognize that free blacks served in the United States Navy from the
Revolution to the Civil War, and from the beginning of the Civil
War free blacks and fugitive slaves served in the US Navy.
Witt further never recognizes or acknowledges why American foreign policy was so proslavery-because from 1789 until
1861 Southerners and their proslavery, Northern doughface allies,179 controlled the presidency, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court. The United States was a slaveholders' republic, supported by a proslavery constitution.180 Witt's failure to understand
this issue undermines his discussion of emancipation.
Witt correctly understands that slavery is a central aspect
of the war, but his history of Lincoln and slavery is ultimately
flawed. This is because he fails to confront the reality of the
American Constitution and its relationship to slavery. Witt argues, for example, that "Lincoln tried his best to avoid the question of whether he could free the South's slaves" (p 197). And he
then concludes that "when the war forced his hand, the first answer Lincoln gave was that he could not" (p 197).
Witt's history here is inaccurate and his analysis is simply
wrong.
Before the war began Lincoln asserted in his first inaugural
address that as president he had no power to interfere with

178 See Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Rev olution 8-9 (North Carolina 1961).
179 A "doughface" was a Northern politician, such as Presidents James Buchanan,
Franklin Pierce, and Millard Fillmore, who supported the South to protect slavery. The
common definition was a "northern man with southern principles." The term implied
that these Northerners had faces made of bread dough, and Southerners could shape
them into anything they wanted. See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme
Court: Prigg v Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's JudicialNationalism, 1994 S Ct
Rev 247, 249 n 14.
180 See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of
Jefferson 3-6 (Sharpe 2001). See generally Paul Finkelman, The Root of the Problem:
How the Proslavlery Constitution Shaped American Race Relations, 4 Barry L Rev 1
(2003).
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slavery in the states where it existed.181 This was a perfectly correct analysis of the US Constitution, which protected slavery at
almost every turn and limited the power of the national government to regulate the domestic institutions of the states. 182
From the Constitutional Convention until the Civil War almost
all lawyers and politicians agreed that Congress simply had no
power to touch slavery in the states where it existed.183 Lincoln
fully understood these constitutional limitations. This did not
mean that Lincoln did not want to end slavery. On the contrary,
his entire career showed his hatred of the institution. He personally despised slavery, as illustrated by his "oft-expressed personal wish that all men every where could be free."184 He was

"naturally anti-slavery" and could "not remember when [he] did
not so think, and feel."185 He believed that "[i]f slavery is not
wrong, nothing is wrong."186 But his personal views did not comport with the constitutional limitations on the national government. When the war began he had no constitutional power to
end slavery, and so he took no steps against slavery.187

Witt confuses Lincoln's understanding of the limits of the
Constitution with a reluctance to challenge slavery. This is in
part because Witt never comes to terms with the proslavery
Constitution, even as he sets out how slavery dominated a number of aspects of American foreign policy and war policy. He

compounds this error by focusing on John C. Fr6mont's vainglorious attempt to end slavery in Missouri in 1861, while (as I note
below) ignoring earlier actions by the Lincoln administration
supporting the emancipation of slaves used by Confederate forces and slaves who escaped from the Confederacy to Union lines.
On August 30, 1861, Fr6mont declared martial law in Missouri
and ordered the confiscation of the property of anyone taking up

181 See Abraham Lincoln, First InauguralAddress-Final Text, in Roy P. Basler, ed,
4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 262, 263 (Rutgers 1953) ("I have no purpose,
directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it
exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.").
182 See Finkelman, Slarery and the Founders at 3-6 (cited in note 180).
183 Id.
184 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Aug 22, 1862), in Roy P. Basler,
ed, 5 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 388, 389 (Rutgers 1953) (containing a
transcript of the letter).
185 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (Apr 4, 1864), in Roy P.
Basler, ed, 7 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 281, 281 (Rutgers 1953).
186 Id.
187 See Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional
Change, 2008 S Ct Rev 349, 355.
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arms against the United States (p 198). He declared that any
slaves they owned would be free.
This proclamation was unprecedented and clearly violated
the Constitution.188 Lincoln asked Fr~mont to withdraw the
proclamation, and when he did not, Lincoln countermanded it.
Witt correctly notes that this decision was in part based on the
need to prevent Kentucky from seceding (p 198). Lincoln
feared-almost certainly correctly-that ending slavery in Missouri would push Kentucky into the Confederacy, and that, as
Witt acknowledges, might have cost Lincoln the war. 189 A Confederate army on the southern bank of the Ohio River would almost certainly have doomed the war effort, while the state's
white population of over 900,000 could have provided the Confederacy with more than 50,000 soldiers.190
After acknowledging and accepting the strategic issues, Witt
goes on to assert that Lincoln countermanded Fr~mont's order
because the President believed that "the customs and usages of
warfare prevented him from doing so" (p 198). He provides no
evidence for this contention, because there is no record of Lincoln discussing this. Significantly, Witt makes this argument in
context of a chapter that begins with the assertion, as I noted
above, that "Lincoln tried his best to avoid the question of
whether he could free the South's slaves" (p 197).
The problem, which Witt does not recognize, is that Missouri was not in the South, at least if we see the South at this
point as being the Confederacy. Missouri had remained in the
Union, as had Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware.191 Furthermore, strategically it was critical for Lincoln to keep these states
in the Union.
Equally important, Witt fails to note or discuss the constitutional issues at stake. Because Missouri was not a Confederate
state, but had remained in the United States, the Constitution
fully applied there. Witt does not seem to understand this issue.
Freeing slaves in Missouri by executive order or military action
would have violated the Constitution and constituted a taking
188 It would have constituted a taking-without due process-under the
Amendment. See Dred Scott i Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393, 408, 450 (1857). It
also have violated the Treason Clause of Article III of the Constitution, since the
cation was that this property was being confiscated for treasonous activity. See US
Art III, § 3, cl 1.
189 See Finkelman, 2008 S Ct Rev at 361 (cited in note 187).

190 See id at 384.

191 See id at 361-62.

Fifth
might
impliConst
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under the Fifth Amendment.192 Lincoln fully understood that the
president, even in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the army, had no power to take property away from American citizens
within the United States, unless it was done with due process
and just compensation. Indeed, Lincoln maintained this position-which was constitutionally correct-throughout the war. 193
The Emancipation Proclamation did not-indeed could notapply to the loyal slave states. Because it was a war measure, it
could only apply to those places making war on the United
States. Thus, Witt is emphatically wrong in his analysis that
"[i]n overruling Fr6mont" Lincoln was following an American
policy, "that the laws of war protected slavery from war's ravages. Civilized warfare, the United States had insisted, prohibited
acts that might incite slaves into a war of servile insurrection
and indiscriminate violence" (p 199). Rather, Lincoln was merely
following the Constitution, which protected slavery within the
United States,194 while also understanding the political reality
that freeing slaves in Missouri might cost him Kentucky and the
war.
In addition to ignoring the centrally important constitutional issues, Witt also ignores the fact that Lincoln and the Congress had already taken steps to emancipate slaves well before
Fr6mont's proclamation. As early as May of 1861 the United

States Army had been harboring slaves who ran away from their
Confederate masters. Nearly a month before Fr6mont's proclamation, Secretary of War Simon Cameron had spelled out that
while US troops could not free slaves in the loyal slave states
(Maryland, Delaware, Missouri, and Kentucky), President Lincoln understood that "in States wholly or partially under insurrectionary control" it was "equally obvious that rights dependent
on the laws of the States within which military operations are
See id at 373-74.
Witt similarly misunderstands General Butler's willingness to suppress a slave
insurrection in Maryland and his refusal to accept runaway slaves who entered Union
lines in New Orleans (pp 202-03). In both cases, Butler's actions were consistent with
federal law and US policy. Maryland, like Missouri, never seceded and thus the US government had a constitutional responsibility to offer its aid to suppress insurrections and
rebellions, as set out in Art I, § 8, cl 15 of the Constitution. Once New Orleans was under
US control (which took place early in the war) Butler felt he was obligated to treat the
city as if it were back in the Union and therefore not to accept fugitive slaves that were
not running from Confederate masters. As Witt notes, Congress then clarified the matter
(pp 202-03). Similarly, when Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation he exempted those places, such as New Orleans, that were under US control.
194 See Dred Scott, 60 US (19 How) at 450.
192

193
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conducted must be necessarily subordinated to the military exigencies created by the insurrection if not wholly forfeited by the
treasonable conduct of the parties claiming them."195 Most importantly, "rights to services" could "form no exception" to "this
general rule."196 Secretary Cameron made it clear that this policy
came directly from the White House.197 On May 30 and again on
August 8, the War Department issued instructions to commanders in the field that effectively freed slaves escaping from the
Confederacy to US Army lines.198 Thus, well before Lincoln countermanded Fr~mont's politically foolish, militarily dangerous,
and clearly unconstitutional order, Lincoln had authorized his
troops to liberate slaves in the South. Once liberated many of
these former slaves were provided with blue uniforms and hired
by the army as civilian employees. As such they built fortifications, tended to wounded, cooked for the army, took care of horses, drove wagons, and even brought ammunition to the front.
Witt also fails to discuss the First Confiscation Act,199 which
Lincoln signed into law in August 1861, before Fr6mont acted.
The First Confiscation Act allowed for the seizure of any slaves
used for military purposes by the Confederacy.200 This was not a
general emancipation act and was narrowly written to allow the
seizure of slaves only in actual use by Confederate forces. Such
confiscations required a judicial hearing and provided for due
process of law.201 Freeing slaves held in the Confederacy was a
legitimate military measure-the kind that Lieber would later
endorse in the Lieber Code.202 Indeed, when Lincoln countermanded Fr6mont's order he specifically referred to the newly
adopted Confiscation Act as a model for dealing with slavery.203
Under this advice, Fr6mont could have freed slaves actually
used to further the Confederate war effort (even if owned by

195 Letter from Simon Cameron to Major General B.F. Butler (Aug 8, 1861), in
George B. Davis, Leslie J. Perry, and Joseph W. Kirkley, 1 The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and ConfederateArmies 761, 762 (GPO
1894).
196 See id.
197 See id at 761.
198 This is discussed in James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Sla very
in the United States, 1861-1865 142-34 (Norton 2013).
199 Act of Aug 6, 1861, ch 60, 12 Stat 319.
200 Act of Aug 6, 1861, ch 60, 12 Stat at 319.
201 Act of Aug 6, 1861, ch 60, 12 Stat at 319.
202 See Lieber Code Art 15 (cited in note 22).
203 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John C. Fr6mont (Sept 2, 1861), in Basler, ed, 4
Collected Works at 506 (cited in note 181).
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Missouri masters), but could not have emancipated slaves of
men in Missouri who took arms against the United States but
did not use their slaves as "tools" for their military activities.204
Witt's analysis of Lincoln misunderstands the constitutional
limitations of the war. Thus, Witt asserts that Lincoln "had reversed Fr6mont's order on the ground that neither he nor Fr6mont could free slaves under the law of war" (p 208). But this is
simply not true. Lincoln countermanded Fr6mont's order because it was bad policy that would jeopardize Unionist support
in loyal slave states, especially Kentucky,205 and because the order was flagrantly unconstitutional. The US government had
absolutely no constitutional power to interfere with slavery
within the loyal states. Well before the events in Missouri, the
United States was emancipating slaves under the laws of war in
Virginia and elsewhere inside the Confederacy. Moreover, as I
discuss below, only a few months before countermanding Fr6mont's order Lincoln had signed the First Confiscation Act,
which specifically authorized the emancipation of slaves used by
the Confederate army. 206
This issue is critical to understanding the Lieber Code and
its goals. From the very beginning of the war, slaves ran to US
Army lines, and Lincoln, the Secretary of War, and Congress all
supported protecting them in their newfound freedom. Furthermore, starting in the spring of 1861 the army began to employ
former slaves. In March 1862, Congress, with Lincoln's approval, forbade any army officer from participating in the return of
any fugitive slaves, even those owned by loyal masters within
the United States.207 In August 1862-before Lincoln issued the
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation-Congress, with
204 Oakes, Freedom National at 156-57 (cited in note 198).
205 Oddly, Witt acknowledges this issue, but seems unable to make sense of it because it does not appear to fit his thesis (p 198).
206 Act of Aug 6, 1861, ch 60, 12 Stat at 319 (providing a procedure by which slaves
could be captured from Confederate lands).
207 Act of Mar 13, 1862, ch 40, 12 Stat 354. This law effectively amended the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, which provided that the state militias and the army could be
used to help return fugitive slaves. See Act of Sept 18, 1850, ch 60, 9 Stat 462. The law
and the policies associated with it are not inconsistent with Lincoln's constitutional view
at the beginning of his administration that he had no power to end slavery in the states
where it existed. He also said that he was obligated to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850, but that did not mean that Congress was obligated to keep the law in force and not
amend it. The 1862 law operated as a de facto amendment of the 1850 law by removing
military enforcement for the law. In addition, of course, by this time Lincoln accepted
General Butler's concept that the US Army could not return slaves to Confederates in a
time of actual rebellion.
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Lincoln's support, approved the enlistment of black troops, and
later that month the War Department authorized the enlistment
of black troops including recently liberated slaves.208 Thus, to
understand the Lieber Code, we must understand that emancipation and the use of black troops was an evolving issue for Lincoln, Congress, the cabinet, and the military. Rather than trying
to "avoid the question of whether he could free the South's
slaves," as Witt incorrectly asserts, (p 197), Lincoln and his army, in conjunction with Congress, focused enormous energy on
how to end slavery under a constitution that in the antebellum
years the great abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison had correctly characterized as "a proslavery compact," and a "covenant with
death and an agreement in Hell."209
In this context, the Lieber Code comported with an evolving
policy on slavery and the use of black troops that began with
General Butler's refusal to return fugitive slaves to a Confederate master in 1861210 and culminated with congressional passage
of the Thirteenth Amendment in January 1865.211 A key piece of
this process was Lieber's legal opinion in April 1862, written
nearly a year before the promulgation of the code, asserting that
the United States, consistent with the laws of war, could free all
slaves entering US Army lines.
VII. SLAVERY, THE LIEBER CODE, AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

The Civil War was ultimately about slavery and the Southern desire to create a nation, in the words of Confederate Vice
President Alexander Stephens, based "upon the great truth, that
the negro is not equal to the white man; that slaverysubordination to the superior race-is his natural and normal
condition."212 There are some people who still believe that secession was about "states' rights" or that it was caused by an

Act of July 17, 1862, ch 201, 12 Stat 597, 599.
See Archibald H. Grimke, William Lloyd Garrison: The Abolitionist 309 (Wagnalls 1891). See also Finkelman, 4 Barry L Rev at 3 (cited in note 180).
210 See notes 195-98 and accompanying text. See also Letter from Cameron to Butler at 761-62 (cited in note 195).
211 James Oakes argues that Lieber also simply incorporated traditional notions of
natural law in the code to allow for emancipation. Oakes, Freedom National at 350-52
(cited in note 198).
212 Alexander H. Stephens, Speech Delivered on the 21st March, 1861, in Savannah,
Known as "The Corner Stone Speech," Reported in the Savannah Republican, in Henry
Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, in Public and Private, with Letters and Speeches, before, during and since the War 717, 721 (National 1866).
208
209

2013]

FrancisLieber and the Modern Law of War

2117

economic conflict between Northern industrialists and Southern
agrarians. But this sort of explanation for secession and the war
ignores the claims made by the secessionists at the time.213 Indeed, many secessionists asserted they were leaving the Union
not because states' rights had been violated but because the
Northern states insisted on using their states' rights to oppose
slavery and to allow abolitionists to openly condemn slavery. If
anything, the claims of secessionists were that the Union had to
be dissolved because the national government had failed to suppress Northern states' rights.214
When we examine the explanations for secession offered by
Southern disunion conventions, it is clear that slavery was at
the root of secession. South Carolina explained it was leaving
the Union because:
A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and
all the States north of that line have united in the election
of a man to the high office of President of the United States,
whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to
be entrusted with the administration of the common Government, because he has declared that that "Government
cannot endure permanently half slave, half free," and that
the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the
course of ultimate extinction.215

The Texas secession convention asserted that Texas had entered
in the American Union "maintaining and protecting the institution known as negro slavery-the servitude of the African to the
white race within her limits-a relation that had existed from
the first settlement of her wilderness by the white race, and
which her people intended should exist in all future time."216
However, the state no longer believed slavery was safe and secure in the Union, and that forming a new nation with other
213 See Finkelman, 45 Akron L Rev at 476 (cited in note 98) (stating Texas cited the
lack of enforcement of federal laws regarding fugitive slaves in several Northern states
as a justification for secession).
214 Id.
215 Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of
South Carolinafront the Federal Union (1861), in May and Faunt, South Carolina Secedes 80 (cited in note 97) (describing the reasons for which South Carolina seceded from
the Union).
216 A Declarationof the Causes Which Inpel the State of Texas to Secede from the
Federal Union (Feb 2, 1861), in Ernest William Winkler, ed, Journal of the Secession
Convention of Texas 61, 62 (Austin 1912) (tracing the history of slavery to beginning of
the "white race").
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slaveholding states was the only solution. Thus Texas was leaving the Union because the Texas secessionists believed that
in this free government [of Texas] all white men are and of
right ought to be entitled to equal civil and political rights;
that the servitude of the African race, as existing in these
States, is mutually beneficial to both bond and free, and is
abundantly authorized and justified by the experience of
mankind, and the revealed will of the Almighty Creator, as
recognized by all Christian nations; while the destruction of
the existing relations between the two races, as advocated
by our sectional enemies, would bring inevitable calamities
upon both and desolation upon the fifteen slave-holding
States.217
The vice president of the Confederacy, Alexander Stephens,
denounced Northern claims that the "enslavement of the African
was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically."218 Stephens noted that
the Northern states believed in racial equality,219 but he explained,
Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite
idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the
great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man;
that slavery-subordination to the superior race-is his
natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is
the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great
physical, philosophical, and moral truth.220

Id at 64.
Stephens, The Corner Stone Speech at 721 (cited in note 212) (explaining why the
South seceded, including arguments that because the North did not support slavery the
South had to leave the Union).
219 Id at 721-22. This was of course something of an exaggeration. Throughout the
North there was vast social discrimination against blacks, and probably a majority of
whites did not believe blacks were their equal. For a classic study of social discrimination in the antebellum North, see generally Leon Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in
the Free States (Chicago 1965). In most of the Northern states blacks had some rights,
but not all the same rights as whites. However, compared to the treatment of free blacks
in the South, the North offered substantial legal equality for African Americans. For a
breakdown of black rights in the North, state-by-state, see Paul Finkelman, Prelude to
the FourteenthAmendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 Rutgers L J
415, 421-30 (1986).
220 Stevens, The Corner Stone Speech at 721 (cited in note 212) (stressing that the
foundation of the Confederacy was a belief in the inferiority of African Americans).
217
218
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Rejecting equality and antislavery, Stephens unabashedly
argued that it was "insanity" to believe "that the negro is equal"
or that slavery was wrong. 22 1 He proudly predicted that the Confederate Constitution "has put at rest, forever, all the agitating
questions relating to our peculiar institution-African slavery as
it exists amongst us-the proper status of the negro in our form
of civilization."222
Mississippi emphatically made the same point: "Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery-the
greatest material interest of the world."223
Northerners fully understood that slavery was the cause of
secession and the war. As Lincoln reflected in his second inaugural address, noting that four years earlier, on the eve of the
Civil War:
One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not
distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the
southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and
powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow,
the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend
this interest was the object for which the insurgents would
rend the Union, even by war; while the government claimed
no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it.224
From the beginning of the war, as slaves escaped to US Army lines, the war was about slavery. Well before Lincoln issued
the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, the status of Confederate slaves was on the table. In May 1861, General Benjamin F. Butler refused to return three slaves who had escaped
from a Confederate colonel on the ground that they were "contrabands of war."225 Instead, Butler gave protection to these
three fugitive slaves, gave them army uniforms to wear, and

221 Id at 721-22.
222 Id at 721.
223 An Address Setting Forth the Declarationof the Immediate Causes Wlhich Induce
and Justify the Secession of Mississippi from the Federal Union and the Ordinanceof Secession 3 (Jackson 1861).
224 Lincoln, Second Inaugural at 332 (cited in note 92) (addressing the role that
slavery had in the Civil War).
225 See Letter from Major General B.F. Butler to Lieutenant General Winfield Scott
(May 24, 1861), in Davis, 1 The War of the Rebellion 752, 752 (cited in note 195).
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hired them as civilian employees of the army. 22 6 By August, the
War Department had endorsed Butler's solution to the problem
of runaways. 227 By this time Congress had passed the First Confiscation Act, which provided a process, although a cumbersome
one, for emancipating slaves owned by Confederates.228 In the
spring of 1862, Congress prohibited the army from participating
in the return of fugitive slaves, whether from enemy masters,
loyal masters in the Confederacy, or masters in the border
states. Any officers returning fugitive slaves could be court martialed and, if convicted, dismissed from military service.229 That
spring Congress also abolished slavery in the District of Columbia230 and, disregarding Chief Justice Taney's assertions in Dred
Scott v Sandford,231 abolished slavery in the federal territories.232

That summer Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act to
make it easier to free slaves owned by ConfederateS233 and
passed a new militia act that allowed for the enlistment of black
troops. 234 A week later, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton authorized General Rufus Saxton, who was based at Hilton Head,
South Carolina, to begin to enlist black troops. 2 35 On September
22, 1862, Abraham Lincoln issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation,236 indicating that on January 1, 1863, he
would issue the final proclamation, unless the seceding states
returned to the Union.237 It was in this period, between the
226 Id. See also Finkelman, 2008 S Ct Rev at 365-66 (cited in note 187). For a good
account of these events, see Louis P. Masur, Lincoln's Hundred Days: The Emancipation
Proclamation and the War for the Union 16-18 (Harvard 2012).
227 See Letter from Cameron to Butler at 761-62 (cited in note 195).
228 Act of Aug 6, 1861, ch 60, 12 Stat at 319.
229 Act of Mar 13, 1862, ch 40, 12 Stat at 354 (modifying an important part of the
fugitive slave law of 1850, which had authorized the use of the military or the militia to
return fugitive slaves).
230 Act of Apr 16, 1862, ch 54, 12 Stat 376.
231 60 US (19 How) 393, 408, 450 (1857).
232 Act of June 10, 1862, ch 111, 12 Stat 432.
233 Act of July 17, 1862, ch 195, 12 Stat 589. This act was still cumbersome and it is
not clear that any slaves ever gained their freedom under it.
234 Act of July 17, 1862, ch 201, 12 Stat at 599.
235 Letter from Edwin M. Stanton to Brigadier-General Saxton (Aug 25, 1862), in
George B. Davis, Leslie J. Perry, and Joseph W. Kirkley, 14 The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 377, 377-78
(GPO 1894).
236 Abraham Lincoln, PreliminaryEmancipation Proclamation,in Basler, ed, 5 Collected Works 433-35 (cited in note 184).
237 No one expected the Confederate states to return to the Union because of the
Proclamation. This offer seems to have had the following three purposes. First, it was a
sop to Northern conservatives and Democrats who opposed emancipation, by indicating
that Lincoln would give the South one more chance to come to its senses. Second, it gave
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preliminary and final proclamations, that Major General Halleck asked Lieber to prepare the Lieber Code.
VIII. THE LIEBER CODE AND THE REGULATION OF SOLDIERS

The slavery provisions in the Lieber Code were thus centrally important, as Witt correctly claims. Southerners argued that
using black soldiers was "[t]he employment of servile insurrection as an instrument of war"238 and was an unacceptable and
immoral innovation in warfare.239 Confederate Secretary of War
James Seddon ranted that the "enlistment of negro slaves as
part of the Army" was a barbarous act, "contrary to the usages of
civilized nations."240 But in taking this position he ignored the
historic use of black soldiers in the War of 1812 and the Revolution. He also ignored that during the Yamasee War, authorities
in colonial South Carolina had enlisted slaves (who were not
emancipated) to fight against the Indians.241 Surely Seddon
knew that during the Revolution thousands of masters had freed
their slaves to fight for American liberty, and that after initial
hesitation, none other than George Washington-who was the
owner of hundreds of slaves-supported the use of recently
emancipated slaves in his army. 24 2 Oddly, while Witt discusses
the fear of British use of emancipated slaves during the Revolution, he never discusses the fact that patriots did this as well.
Indeed, by the end of the Revolution one of George Washington's
most reliable combat units was the First Rhode Island. About

the United States a short window to prepare for the dawn of a new age without slavery.
Third, it allowed Emancipation Day to be on January 1, giving the act of ending slavery
a talismanic date that would be meaningful and easily celebrated. See generally,
Finkelman, 2008 S Ct Rev 349 (cited in note 187); Masur, Lincoln's Hundred Days (cited
in note 226).
238 Letter from James A. Seddon to Robert Ould (June 24, 1863), in George B. Davis,
Leslie J. Perry, and Joseph W. Kirkley, 6 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and ConfederateArmies 41, 44 (GPO 1894).
239 Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon quoted in Witt at 245. Letter from
Seddon to Ould at 44 (cited in note 238).
240 Id at 44-45.
241 See, for example, Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution at 8-9 (cited in
note 178). See also John Sibley Butler, Affirmative Action in the Military, 523 Annals Am
Acad Polit & Soc Sci 196, 198 (1992); William McKee Evans, Sociology of Slavery, in Paul
Finkelman and Joseph C. Miller, eds, 2 Macmillan Encyclopedia of World Slavery 684,
685 (Macmillan 1998) ("[A]s late as 1715, South Carolina used slaves as soldiers in the
Yamassee war.").
242 Henry Wiencek, An Imperfect God: George Wlashington, His Slaves, and the Creation of America 218, 223 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2003).
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half the soldiers in that regiment were black and most had been
slaves when the Revolution began.243
Seddon's position, which Witt does not really interrogate,
also ignored the fact that the United States was not enlisting
black "slaves," but free blacks, although some had only been recently emancipated.244 This of course also followed the pattern of
the Revolution, when masters emancipated thousands of slaves
in the North, and some in the South, so they could fight in the
War of Independence. This also happened in the Civil War. Masters in Kentucky emancipated thousands of slaves so they could
serve in the United States Army.245 These masters usually received the enlistment bonus instead of their ex-slaves, but their
ex-slaves were now legally free.
There is one more aspect of using black troops that is central to the importance of the Lieber Code and to understanding
the Confederate response to black troops. Initially, many blacks
in the US Army were from the North and had been free when
the war began. Others were free men of color from Louisiana.
Thus, the Confederate objection to black troops must be understood as being not only an objection to "servile insurrection" (p
199), as Seddon put it, and as Witt emphasizes, but more broadly to allowing any African Americans to serve in the military.
After all, many of the blacks serving in the US Army had never

been slaves and others had been emancipated by their owners.
In other words, Confederate policy was not merely about slavery
but also about race.
Illustrative of this issue was the disposal of the bodies of
soldiers from the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment (sometimes known as the "Glory Brigade"), the first black
regiment raised in the North, after the attack on Battery Wagner near Charleston. Most of the soldiers in the 54th were free
Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution at 81 (cited in note 178).
The one exception was the recruitment of blacks on the Sea Islands off the coast
of South Carolina. These men had been slaves when the war began, but their masters
had abandoned them when the US Army arrived, and the army treated this abandonment of the slaves as an effective emancipation. After the army arrived on the Sea Islands these abandoned slaves-who were now considered to be free people-were fed,
housed, and educated by the army and by civilian volunteers when they were recruited
for military service. See Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal
Experiment 22 (Oxford 1964) (stating that Union officials noted that blacks on Sea Island
had a "widespread desire to learn to read," and that there was "no reason why Negroes
would not make good and responsible soldiers").
245 Lowell H. Harrison and James C. Klotter, A New History of Kentucky 180 (Kentucky 1997).
243

244
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black men from the North; thus this regiment was not an example of "servile insurrection." The Confederates refused to return
these bodies to the United States Army or to give them a proper
burial. Instead, they were dumped into a giant pit along with
the body of their white commander, Colonel Robert Gould
Shaw.246 This behavior violated all accepted forms of the treatment of the bodies of enemy soldiers.
More importantly, Seddon ignored the fact that Confederate
armies had been kidnapping free blacks in the North and enslaving them, which was clearly a barbarous act "contrary to the
usages of civilized nations."247 No Western armies had enslaved
captured enemies for centuries or longer. The Confederates had
resurrected the practices of the ancient and medieval worlds of
enslaving their enemies to support their race-based republic.
The Lieber Code was designed in part to protect these newly
enlisted black soldiers, whom Southerners sought to enslavenot re-enslave-when they were captured in battle. Witt makes
this clear (pp 240-41). It was also designed to condemn the enslavement of Northern blacks by Confederate armies, which
Witt unfortunately does not discuss.
The slavery provisions were important to the Lieber Code.
But, the Lieber Code was equally important for other reasons.
The Lieber Code was designed to limit the destructiveness of the
war by providing a set of real rules for the disposition of property in the South and to rein in the behavior of United States
troops, while at the same time providing a framework to allow
US troops to live off the land while crossing the South. The
Lieber Code was promulgated before Sherman's March to the
Sea, but both he and Grant had used such tactics in Mississippi
in 1862, and it was clear they would be used again. Thus, Lieber
provided the military with solid rules as to what they could do,
and not do, while conquering the enemy. Significantly, Lieber,
ever the scholar, sought to protect works of art, libraries, and
buildings used for charitable purposes from looting and destruction. These were important rules that distinguished the Civil
War from earlier wars. Lieber knew about the looting by troops
of all nations during the Napoleonic wars and he tried to curb
such practices as barbaric and unsupported by military necessity.

246
247

See Rose, Rehearsalfor Reconstruction at 258-59 (cited in note 244).
See Letter from Seddon to Ould at 44 (cited in note 238).
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The Lieber Code also included provisions on prisoners of
war that set a standard that the United States was supposed to
adhere to,248 and in part created a new view of international law
that still exists today. In the first part of his book Witt describes
in great detail the horrid conditions of prisoners of war during
the Revolution and in conflicts with Indians. Witt provides important evidence of the barbaric treatment of Indians by US officers, including summary executions of captured Indian soldiers
(pp 332-38). The Lieber Code was a huge step forward in the
treatment of prisoners. It not only set a standard for how the US
should behave, but would be the basis of the Geneva Convention
provisions on prisoners in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries.249

The Lieber Code also set the stage for post-war prosecutions
for those who violated the law of war. After the war, the United
States tried and executed Captain Henry Wirz for the barbaric
conditions at the Andersonville Prison. This was the first time
the United States had tried a defeated enemy officer for war
crimes.250 As Witt points out, in proper lawyerly ways, Wirz's
trial by a military commission violated modern rules of due process in a number of ways (pp 298-301). It is a great case to pick
apart for the failure of the commission to adhere to strict rules of
fairness. This was the first time the United States had carried
out such a trial, and I suppose we should not be surprised that
there were problems with the prosecution. It also may be that
the mistakes made in this trial had a long term effect. The prosecutions in Nuremberg and subsequent war crimes trials have
been much fairer.
In critiquing the Wirz trial, however, Witt failed to explain
two critical issues. First, the Lieber Code put the Confederates

248 In fact of course the United States was unable to provide safe and healthy prisoner of war camps for many Confederates, but these horrible conditions were never the
result of intentional behavior of US officers, in the way that Captain Wirz behaved in
Andersonville. See note 120.
249 See Geneva Convention, Art 13, 6 UST at 3326 (cited in note 109).
250 After the Dakota War, the United States brought nearly 400 Dakota (Sioux) soldiers before a military commission and sentenced 303 to death. These hearings were
summary proceedings, sometimes lasting less than ten minutes and can hardly be called
trials in any meaningful way. See Finkelman, 39 Wm Mitchell L Rev at 426 (cited in
note 120) (stating that many of the "trials" lasted no more than five to ten minutes). See
also Carol Chomsky, The United States Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 Stan L Rev 13, 46-47 (1990) (stating that "as many as thirty or forty trials" involving the Dakota were conducted in a single day); Maeve Herbert, Explaining the
Sioux Military Commission of 1862, 40 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 743, 777 (2009).
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on notice that criminal behavior towards prisoners of war would
not be tolerated. Confederates may have hated the Lieber Code,
but it did create a new standard for how to treat prisoners. The
Lieber Code was of course not legally binding on the Confederacy, but it sent a clear message the United States would expect
Confederates to provide humane treatment to prisoners. Even
without the Lieber Code, the treatment of prisoners at Andersonville also violated generally accepted usages of war, the Articles of War that had governed American armies before the Civil
War, and the General Regulations, which the Confederate government adopted (p 86). In regard to the treatment of prisoners
the Lieber Code reiterated and clarified rules, laws, and general
understandings and usages that had been accepted by all Americans since at least the Revolution. Indeed, as Witt shows in his
early chapters, during and after the Revolution and the War of
1812 the United States (which was led by Southern slaveowners
at this time) bitterly complained about the British treatment of
American prisoners (pp 21-41, 67-69). In other words, Confederate leaders fully understood that at Andersonville they were
intentionally violating what Witt calls "The Rules of Civilized
Warfare" (p 49). The Lieber Code simply put them on notice that
there might be consequences for such behavior. This was the beginning of modern notions of war crimes.

Second, Witt failed to consider the substantive issues surrounding Andersonville. Most of the deaths at Andersonville
were caused by a thoroughly polluted water supply. This was
because the only water in the camp available to prisoners came
from a stream that ran through the camp that was used by Confederate troops as a latrine. Thus, Confederates upstream poisoned the river, and the prisoners of war were forced to drink
this pollution. This problem could have easily been alleviated if
Wirz had wanted to solve it. But he did not. By the end of the
war there was just a small channel of free flowing water in the
center of this stream that was not thoroughly polluted.251 If US
prisoners waded into the stream they could reach this relatively
clean water with their water dippers and have somewhat safe
water. But, Wirz roped off the center of the stream and declared
that anyone reaching over the rope would be presumed to be trying to escape (which was in fact absurd) and would be shot. The
result was that US soldiers were forced to choose between risking

251

See McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom at 796-97 (cited in note 102).
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death by drinking thoroughly polluted water, or risking death by
reaching over a rope for clean water. This policy was clearly a
war crime, a violation of pre-Civil War understandings of proper
military behavior, and a violation of the Lieber Code. Wirz was
justly tried for this policy. The fact that his trial was a procedural mess does not detract from the importance of the Lieber
Code in setting out rules for the treatment of prisoners.
The tragedy of the postwar experience is not the botched
trial of Wirz, but the failure to prosecute those Confederates
who enslaved blacks in the North and murdered surrendering
black troops. At Fort Pillow, troops under Major General Nathan
Bedford Forrest massacred surrendering black troops, shooting
many while they attempted to surrender, and according to many
witnesses, burying alive, or burning alive some captured black
troops. 25 2 These acts violated all internationally accepted rules of
behavior. Sadly, Forrest (who would be the founder of the Ku
Klux Klan after the Civil War) was never brought to justice for
this, just as Jubal Early was not tried for ordering the enslavement of blacks in Pennsylvania, and Robert E. Lee was not
brought to justice for approving the enslavement of Northern
blacks and seizing white citizens as hostages and for retribution.
Similarly, Confederate political officials, like Secretary of War
Seddon, were not tried for refusing to treat captured black

troops the same as whites.
To their credit, General Grant and his subordinates refused
to participate in prisoner exchanges when the Confederates refused to exchange black prisoners. Lincoln and Secretary of War
Stanton backed them on this.253 The result was of course more
misery for both US prisoners in the South and Confederate prisoners in the North (pp 259-60). Importantly, Witt thoroughly
demolishes the myth that the refusal to exchange prisoners was
part of a ghoulish conclusion by Grant and Sherman that exchanges helped the South, which was running out of soldiers,
while adding little to the US war effort. As Witt notes, even before the conflict over prisoner exchanges and black troops arose,
Lieber, Major General Halleck, and others concluded that the
United States needed to stand firm on the issue of treating black
soldiers the same way white soldiers were treated. Witt's discussion of this issue is particularly useful. He notes that the policy
252 Cornish, The Sable Arm at 175 (cited in note 104); John Hope Franklin, From
Slavery to Freedom:A History of Negro Americans 292 (Knopf 3d ed 1967).
253 See McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom at 792-93 (cited in note 102).
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was not popular because it left white soldiers in captivity. But it
was fundamentally just (pp 259-63). It also exposed the Confederacy for what it was: a white supremacist nation that valued
racism above practical and useful policies. Thus, the Confederate official in charge of prisoner exchanges told his United
States counterpart that the Confederate soldiers would "die in
the last ditch" before agreeing to prisoner exchanges that involved blacks (p 261). The inhumanity on this issue-which led
to needless suffering of tens of thousands of soldiers on both
sides-was not caused by Lincoln, Halleck, Grant, or Lieber. It
was caused by the Confederate administration that valued racism and slavery over both military efficiency and the welfare of
their own soldiers who had been captured in battle.
The issue of prisoner exchanges, along with the kidnapping
of free blacks, takes us back to the importance of the Lieber
Code. By developing the Lieber Code as he did, Lieber provided
a nonracist and thoroughly honorable set of rules for the treatment of all human beings. This policy would become even more
important in World War II, and it would even affect the most
horrible and lawless regimes in world history. Thus, after the
war the Allies tried Nazis for war crimes based on a modern law
of war that emerged from the Lieber Code.
IX. THE LIMITS OF LAW IN WAR

In the last part of his book, Witt details horrendous behavior on the part of the United States towards Indians and combatants in faraway places, such as the Philippines. Witt argues
that the Lieber Code allowed for a different kind of warfare
against "savages" and thus concludes that Lieber and Lincoln
both "helped make the laws of war safe for Indian fighting" (pp
337-38). Such a statement cuts against Lieber's own views that
barbaric behavior by American Indians did not justify the same
behavior by the United States. Even before he wrote the Lieber
Code, Lieber told Major General Halleck that "[i]f Indians slowly
roast our men, we cannot and must not roast them in turn" (p
236). On the contrary, no matter what the provocation of the enemy, the United States could not "sink to the level of fiends" (p
236). As Lieber noted, "Men who take up arms against one another in public war, do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God" (p 237). Thus it is
hard to imagine that Lieber's work was designed to justify the
massacre of native women and children. Nor was it legitimately
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used to do so. Similarly, his absolute opposition to torture precluded the kind of treatment the United States meted out to
guerillas in the Philippines. As Witt notes in his book, "Torture
was not allowed in civilized war, not even against savages" (p
184). Witt's analysis of Lieber is correct here, which is why his
attempt to connect the Lieber Code to subsequent Indian wars
or the atrocities in the Philippines makes no sense (pp 354-56).
Witt's claims also run counter to Lincoln's known opposition
to unnecessary killing. The statement also conflicts with the evidence we have of Lincoln's behavior. Lincoln's actions in the
wake of the Dakota War of 1862 illustrate that he opposed unnecessary killing of American Indians just as he did of whites.254
The outbreak of violence between the Dakota (Sioux) and whites
on the Minnesota frontier led to the death of as many as 1,000
whites. After the Dakota had been suppressed, the US Army
held summary trials and sentenced 303 Dakota to be hanged,
although the vast majority of these men had not committed any
recognizable crimes. Lincoln ordered a review of every case and
effectively pardoned 265 of those sentenced to death by refusing
to certify their executions (p 333). He acted over the strenuous
objections of the military authorities in Minnesota and his own
Republican allies in that state. When Lincoln's margin of victory
in Minnesota declined in the 1864 election, Senator Alexander

Ramsey, a fellow Republican, told Lincoln "that if he had hung
more Indians, we should have given him his old majority."255
Lincoln's response reflected his own legal and moral standards:
"I could not afford to hang men for votes."256 While Lincoln acted
in the Minnesota case before Lieber had even begun to write the
Lieber Code, Lincoln did have at his disposal Lieber's writings
on prisoners of war and guerilla warfare.257 Thus, it is perhaps
more likely that Lieber and Lincoln set a new standard for the
treatment of Indians that was less brutal than previous behavior.
Indeed, to accept Witt's argument, Witt or some other scholar would have to provide evidence that the treatment of American Indians by whites after the promulgation of the Lieber Code
was demonstrably worse than before, and then argue that had it
not been for Lieber Code the treatment of American Indians
254 See Finkelman, 39 Wm Mitchell L Rev at 433 (cited in note 120).
255 David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy and Politics 118
(Missouri 1978).
256 Id.
257 See Finkelman, 39 Wm Mitchell L Rev at 440-42 (cited in note 120).
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would have been better in the late nineteenth century than it
was. But Witt's own evidence from the colonial and revolutionary period demonstrates that the brutality of Indian wars before
the Civil War was surely as bad, and probably much worse, than
anything after the war (pp 93-99). Witt's own evidence, in the
beginning of his book, shows the routine slaughter of American
Indians in battle and after they surrendered, including by American troops during the Revolution.
On the other hand, it is plausible to argue that the Lieber
Code may have made Indian wars, or at least their aftermath,
less brutal. The army did not summarily execute Geronimo, for
example, but instead he was arrested, imprisoned, and ultimately freed (p 335). Similarly, after he was captured, Sitting Bull
was not executed, even though his Indian soldiers had wiped out
Custer and his band at the Little Big Horn. It is hard to imagine
the army not killing Sitting Bull before the Lieber Code. In 1838
the army arrested the Seminole chief Osceola when he came to
make peace under a flag of truce in 1838-which was banned by
the Lieber Code. Osceola died shortly thereafter in prison.258 It
does not diminish the horrors of Sand Creek and Wounded Knee
to imagine that without the Lieber Code the treatment of Indians-especially leaders after wars ended-would have been
much worse.
My sense is that Witt is simply wrong in arguing that the
Lieber Code is even remotely the cause of these atrocities. The
Lieber Code does not explain this brutal violence, which was in
violation of the Lieber Code and Lieber's own views of warfare
with Indians. Rather, what needs to be explained is not how the
Lieber Code led to such atrocities-because it did not-but rather why the United States failed to follow its own rules (including the Lieber Code) and instincts. In the end, the postwar experience demonstrates that the laws of war are difficult to
implement, and that at times they fail. In every war there have
been atrocities and acts of barbarism, but the Lieber Code has
served to lessen such behavior, and has led to punishments for
those who violate the rules.259

258 Thom Hatch, Osceola and the Great Seminole War: A Struggle for Justice and
Freedom 214-15 (St Martin 2012)
259 See, for example, Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz, The
Limits of Law: On Establishing Civilian Responsibility for the Enforcement of Laws
against War Crimes, in Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz, eds, The
My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of Law? 1, 3 (Free 1976).

2130

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:2071

The American military in the West in the late nineteenth
century and in the Philippines in the early twentieth century
lacked the leadership of men like Generals Grant, Butler, and
David Hunter. After the war some veterans, like Generals Oliver
Otis Howard and his brother Charles Howard tried to bring humane warfare to the West and negotiated honestly with Indian
nations (pp 336-37). Where they had authority there were no
massacres or horrendous violations of human rights. Other veterans, most notably Generals Sheridan and Sherman, were also
in the West. They pushed the Indians hard, but despite Sheridan's alleged statement "the only good Indians I saw were
dead,"260 they did not perpetrate massacres of women and children, as happened at Sand Creek (during the war) or at Wounded Knee (after the war). Thus, Witt is incorrect in claiming that
the Lieber Code set the stage for the horrible brutality of some
of late nineteenth-century campaigns against the Indians. The
Lieber Code did not prevent these atrocities (although it may
very well have prevented more atrocities from happening in the
aftermath of the Civil War), but the Lieber Code certainly did
not condone them or lead to them.
More likely, it seems that the brutality of the Indian wars
and the horrors of the Philippine insurrection were caused by
other factors. One of them is the distance of the violence from

the American people. With few newspapers to report what is going on, the army in both places could more freely operate without restraint. This is a lesson about transparency, independent
reporting, and the First Amendment. Another involves race. The
army may have felt less restrained because Indians and Filipinos were not white. Indeed, the Lieber Code, the US policy on
prisoner exchanges, and the whole war against slavery are remarkable for the enormous steps away from the racism of the
age. That they did not fully take hold in the West or in the Pacific should not surprise us, but it is hardly a result of the Lieber
Code or Lincoln's policies.
Another reason the Lieber Code did not stop brutality in the
West may have to do with the quality of military leadership in
the West. Many Civil War officers, including many generals,
were lawyers, politicians, and abolitionists before the war. They
brought a civilian culture with them that was lacking in the

260 See Wolfang Mieder, "The Only Good Indian Is a Dead Indian": History and
Meaning of a ProverbialStereotype, 106 J Am Folklore 38, 45 (1993).
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West after the Civil War. The abolitionist tradition that many
US officers carried into battle did not continue after the war.
One of the worst massacres in the West took place at Sand
Creek in 1864. Sand Creek was perpetrated by local settlers
serving in the First Colorado Volunteers, who were not trained
by the regular army and who were led by a local commander
with no military training and no ties to the antislavery movement. 261 Whether any member of the First Colorado Volunteers
read the Lieber Code is unknown. But these were not regular
army units and had little connection to the main agenda of the
Civil War. This was a local war of vengeance that was reminiscent of the barbaric settler-Indian conflicts in the colonial period. Wounded Knee, on the other hand, took place in 1890, six
years after General Sherman had retired and two years after
General Philip Sheridan had died. Witt's desire to blame Sherman, Sheridan, Lincoln, and Lieber for the most brutal atrocities against Indians just does not comport with the history.
CONCLUSION

As I have indicated, I have some serious disagreements with
Witt about the postwar implications of the Lieber Code, his failure to come to terms with the proslavery Constitution and its
implications for his history, and his history of Lincoln and early
emancipation. I also think his failure to consider Confederate
policy on enslaving captured African American soldiers undermines the book.
But despite these reservations, Lincoln's Code is an enormously impressive book. It reminds us why legal history is an
important component of not only legal education but larger issues of law practice and international law. The law of war is far
from perfect. Like many areas of law, it often operates ex post
facto. Those who violate the accepted codes of behavior are punished, if at all, only after they have committed atrocities and
crimes. But in an imperfect world, the fear of ex post facto implementation of the law of war may deter some who might commit war crimes, and punishment subsequent to criminal behavior is preferable to none at all.262 Moreover, in the modern world
See generally Stan Hoig, The Sand Creek Massacre (Oklahoma 1961).
As Nazi Germany implemented its regime of hatred, racism, and death, at least
some of that nation's leaders paused before breaking international law. Fritz Sauckel,
Hitler's plenipotentiary for labor mobilization, was prosecuted, convicted, and hanged at
Nuremberg for the deportation of more than five million human beings for slave labor.
261

262
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the law of war is increasingly used to support international interventions to prevent crimes against humanity.
Witt's book thus not only teaches us how we came to have
an international law of war, but also reminds us of what the
costs are if we do not have such a law. Lincoln's Code is a tour
de force. It should be read by anyone interested in international
law and the law of war. For lawyers, judges, and scholars interested in the United States, Witt once again reminds us how the
rule of law interacts with the central issue of American history:
slavery and the preservation of the national state.

Many of them died, while almost all suffered "under terrible conditions of cruelty and
suffering." At his trial Sauckel rested his defense on the grounds that he had personally
told Hitler that this mode of labor recruitment violated international law. Obviously
Sauckel was not in the end deterred by international law and his "just following orders"
defense failed. But the very notion that he was concerned with international law suggests it can have some power, even in the most ruthless and barbaric of regimes. See
Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery 449 (Cambridge
2009). For more on this, see generally Seymour Drescher and Paul Finkelman, Slavery,
in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law 890 (Oxford 2012).

